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Goals and Governance in Municipal
Bankruptcy
Juliet M. Moringiello*
Abstract
The years from 2011 to 2013 were remarkable in municipal
bankruptcy terms. During those years, several cities and counties
took the rare step of filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code. When Detroit filed for bankruptcy in July 2013,
it became the largest city measured by both population and
outstanding debt to file for Chapter 9.
The recent filings challenge the conventional wisdom that
Chapter 9 is poorly tailored to the rehabilitation needs of larger
cities and counties. Those who have written about Chapter 9 in the
past twenty years have treated Chapter 9 and state intervention in
municipal financial affairs as freestanding alternatives rather
than as complementary components of a comprehensive municipal
financial recovery plan. These authors compare municipal
bankruptcy to corporate bankruptcy and conclude that, because
Chapter 9 does not incorporate all of the Chapter 11 checks on
debtor behavior, it cannot adequately promote the financial
rehabilitation of a sizable general-purpose municipality. This
approach ignores the original goal of Congress in enacting a
municipal bankruptcy law in the aftermath of the Great
Depression, which was to bring together two sovereigns, the state
and the federal government, to accomplish something that neither
could accomplish alone—the imposition of a plan to adjust
municipal debts that would be binding on all creditors, wherever
located.
This Article refocuses the discussion about the limitations of
the municipal bankruptcy process by examining the goals of
* Professor, Widener University School of Law. Many thanks to Scott
Pryor and David Skeel for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. I would
also like to thank my research assistants, Corey Dietz and Julia Skinner, for
their diligent and enthusiastic help with this article.
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Chapter 9 and relating its governance provisions to those goals. A
refocused discussion is particularly timely because the
deteriorating financial condition of many cities has led states to
reexamine their programs for resolving municipal financial
distress and the conditions under which they permit their
municipalities to file for bankruptcy. Chapter 9 may only be as
effective as the state governance that accompanies it. Therefore,
policy makers on the state and federal levels need an
understanding of the role of Chapter 9 in an integrated scheme for
municipal financial recovery in order to decide whether and how
to assist municipalities on the state level and to decide whether
reforms to Chapter 9 are necessary.
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I. Introduction
Municipal bankruptcy occupies a rarely studied corner of
bankruptcy law. Coverage of its governing Bankruptcy Code
(Code) chapter, Chapter 9,1 in law school casebooks and treatises
is almost nonexistent,2 and scholars turn their attention to the
subject only when a high-profile case is filed.3 There is a simple
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012).
2. See, e.g., MARGARET HOWARD, BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 21
(5th ed. 2012) (explaining that Chapter 9 “governs the bankruptcy of
municipalities [and] is used only occasionally,” and adding that “[w]e will not
cover it in this casebook”); CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 116–
17 (2d ed. 2009) (giving an overview of Chapter 9; the remaining coverage in the
over 1,400 page treatise appears on four other pages); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 109 (6th ed. 2009)
(devoting about six pages in a 931-page casebook to a description of Chapter 9
and acknowledging that Orange County filed for bankruptcy).
3. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The
Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local
Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625, 625–26 (1994) (considering Bridgeport’s
Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing shortly after it happened); David L. Dubrow,
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Viable Option for Municipalities in Fiscal
Crisis?, 24 URB. LAW. 539, 539 (1992) (discussing Chapter 9 bankruptcy right
after Bridgeport, Connecticut, filed for bankruptcy); Kevin A. Kordana, Tax
Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1997)
(mentioning Orange County, California’s filing for bankruptcy shortly after the
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reason for this lack of attention: very few municipalities have
filed for bankruptcy.4 Fewer than 700 cases have been filed since
1938,5 when the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a municipal bankruptcy chapter.6 Even this
number is misleadingly high; the overwhelming majority of the
municipalities that have filed for bankruptcy were specialpurpose districts such as water and sewer districts7 rather than
general-purpose municipalities such as cities, counties, and
towns.
The years from 2011 to 2013 were therefore remarkable in
municipal bankruptcy terms. During those years, several generalpurpose municipalities took the rare step of filing for bankruptcy
under Chapter 9. Among those filing were a small Rhode Island
city, Central Falls;8 Pennsylvania’s capital city, Harrisburg
(whose filing was dismissed six weeks later);9 Jefferson County,
county did so); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go
Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
425, 456 (1993) (mentioning Bridgeport’s 1991 filing in explaining Chapter 9);
Frederick Tung, After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal
Bankruptcy Law, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 885, 886–87 (2002) (discussing Orange
County’s bankruptcy filing and its historic effect).
4. See JAMES SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER, LLC, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL
DEBT ADJUSTMENT, app. C (2012), http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bank
ruptcy_Primer.pdf (showing the historical breakdown of municipal
bankruptcies, which indicates that only 635 municipal bankruptcies have been
filed between 1937 and 2012).
5. Id. This is a miniscule number; in 2012 alone, 1,221,091 bankruptcy
petitions were filed under all chapters. U.S. COURTS, BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS
CASES COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12MONTH PERIOD ENDING DEC. 31, 2012 (2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2012/1212_f2.pdf.
6. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 47–48 (1938).
7. See SPIOTTO, supra note 4, at app. C (showing that the municipal
utilities and special districts filings were nearly three times that of cities or
counties). Under the Bankruptcy Code, a municipality may file only for Chapter
9, 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012), and the Code defines municipality as “political
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40)
(2012). Between 1980 and January 31, 2012, 264 municipalities filed petitions
under Chapter 9, only 49 of which were cities, counties, or towns.
8. See Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains
Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012, at A21 (explaining that the court confirmed
the Central Falls plan of adjustment in September 2012).
9. Michael Corkery & Kris Maher, Capital Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 13, 2011, at A3; see also In re City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 765
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011) (dismissing the Chapter 9 case).
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Alabama;10 and Stockton, California.11 Just over a month after
Stockton filed, another California city, San Bernardino, filed for
Chapter 9 protection.12 The media described the Jefferson County
and Stockton bankruptcies in superlative terms: Jefferson County
as the largest municipal bankruptcy ever filed measured by
outstanding debt,13 and Stockton as the largest city measured by
population ever to file for bankruptcy.14 Both of these
municipalities lost their bragging rights in July 2013 when
Detroit became the largest city, measured by both population and
outstanding debt, to file for Chapter 9.15
These recent filings challenge the conventional wisdom that
Chapter 9 is poorly tailored to the rehabilitation needs of larger
cities and counties. As news of impending financial doom in
Harrisburg, Jefferson County, and several California cities
emerged, so did scholarly articles questioning the utility of
Chapter 9.16 Authors who have written about municipal
10. Barnett Wright, Jefferson County Files Largest Government Bankruptcy
in U.S. History, THE BIRMINGHAM NEWS BLOG (Nov. 10, 2011, 5:00 AM),
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/11/jefferson_county_files_for_lar.html
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. Bobby White, Stockton Files for Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J.,
June 29, 2012, at A2.
12. See Steven Church, Dawn McCarthy & Michael Bathon, San
Bernardino, California, Files Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2012,
7:38
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-02/san-bernardinocalifornia-files-for-bankruptcy-protection-2-.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. Wright, supra note 10.
14. White, supra note 11.
15. Matthew Dolan, Record Bankruptcy for Detroit, WALL ST. J., July 19,
2013, at A1.
16. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and
Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012)
[hereinafter Gillette, Fiscal Federalism]; Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351
(2010) [hereinafter Kimhi, Solution]; Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and
Debt, 121 YALE L J. 860 (2012). The financial problems faced by cities have also
generated discussion about whether states should be permitted to file for
bankruptcy, something that is currently prohibited. See generally Adam
Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 81 (2012); Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of
Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399 (2012); Thomas Moers Mayer, State
Sovereignty, State Bankruptcy, and a Reconsideration of Chapter 9, 85 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 363 (2011); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State
“Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV. 322 (2011); David A. Skeel, States of
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bankruptcy in the past twenty years approach Chapter 9 and
state intervention in municipal financial affairs as freestanding
alternatives rather than complementary components of a
comprehensive municipal financial recovery plan.17 From that
vantage point, they compare Chapter 9 to other bankruptcy
chapters, notably Chapter 11, and then conclude that because
Chapter 9 does not incorporate all of the Chapter 11 checks on
debtor behavior, it cannot adequately promote the financial
rehabilitation of a sizable general-purpose municipality and is
thus an undesirable alternative to ex ante state intervention.18
This approach ignores the original goal of Congress in enacting a
municipal bankruptcy law in the aftermath of the Great
Depression. When Congress passed the predecessor to Chapter 9,
it did so in order to bring together two sovereigns, the state and
the federal government, to accomplish something that neither
could accomplish alone—the imposition of a plan to adjust
municipal financial liabilities that would be binding on all the
municipality’s creditors, wherever located.19
At the same time, the deteriorating financial condition of
many cities has led states to reexamine both their own programs
for resolving municipal financial distress and the conditions
under which they permit their municipalities to file for
bankruptcy. States have unfettered discretion in allowing their
municipalities to file for bankruptcy; the Code allows a
municipality to be a debtor under Chapter 9 only if it is
“specifically authorized” by its state to file for bankruptcy.20 In
the past few years, several states have revised their laws
governing the ability of their municipalities to file for
bankruptcy.21
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012).
17. Frederick Tung is the exception. See Tung, supra note 3, at 929
(concluding that a law requiring the governor to authorize municipal
bankruptcy filings in California would “encourage early interaction between
local and state officials and ultimately a cooperative approach to resolving local
distress”).
18. Infra Part II.B.
19. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 53–54 (1938).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012).
21. See, e.g., Karol K. Denniston, Neutral Evaluation in Chapter 9
Bankruptcies: Mitigating Municipal Distress, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 261, 261–62
(2012) (discussing California’s Assembly Bill 506, which became effective on
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In this Article, I refocus the discussion about the limitations
of the municipal bankruptcy process by examining the goals of
municipal bankruptcy and relating the governance provisions in
Chapter 9 to those goals in order to illustrate that Chapter 9 is
only as effective as the state oversight that accompanies it. The
recent municipal bankruptcy filings, especially that of Detroit,
illustrate that larger municipalities will resort to Chapter 9 to
alleviate their financial problems. These filings reopen the
discussion about the usefulness of Chapter 9. Policy makers on
the state level need a better understanding of how Chapter 9
bankruptcy was designed to complement, rather than replace,
state financial intervention plans. This understanding will help
them develop comprehensive schemes to deal with their
distressed cities, towns and counties. Policy makers on the
federal level must be able to identify the deficiencies in Chapter 9
in light of this shared governance goal. Chapter 9 was never
designed to be an independent solution to municipal financial
problems. An understanding of the goals of Chapter 9 and its role
in an integrated scheme for municipal financial recovery can
assist both groups of policy makers in deciding whether and how
to assist the municipalities on the state level and in deciding
whether reforms to Chapter 9 are necessary.
To refocus the discussion about managing municipal
financial distress, Part II discusses the constitutional
underpinnings of Chapter 9’s structure as well as the view that
the structure eviscerates bankruptcy’s effectiveness as a
January 1, 2012, and which requires a California municipality to participate in
a neutral evaluation process before filing a Chapter 9 petition); Juliet M.
Moringiello, Specific Authorization to File Under Chapter 9: Lessons from
Harrisburg, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 237, 248–50 (2012) (explaining that Pennsylvania
revised its authorization statute in response to Harrisburg’s financial distress);
Katherine Newby Kishfy, Note, Preserving Local Autonomy in the Face of
Municipal Financial Crisis: Reconciling Rhode Island’s Response to the Central
Falls Financial Crisis with the State’s Home Rule Tradition, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 348, 377–82 (2011) (explaining that the Rhode Island General
Assembly enacted a fiscal oversight statute in response to the financial
problems in Central Falls); Paul Egan, New Emergency Manager Law Signed,
But Opponents Already Talking About Legal Challenge, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2012312280118
(last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (discussing the new bill the governor signed into law
regarding municipal bankruptcy and the likely legal challenges) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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municipal rehabilitation tool. Part III discusses the relationship
between bankruptcy goals and bankruptcy governance in order to
explain the governance structure in Chapter 9. I then discuss the
history of Chapter 9 in Part IV to illustrate that the original
proponents of a municipal bankruptcy chapter designed it to
invite the states to manage their municipalities’ use of
bankruptcy. Part V discusses the extent to which states have
accepted this invitation to govern their municipalities in
bankruptcy. Part VI uses a specific example, that of
Pennsylvania’s response to Harrisburg’s distress, to illustrate the
confusion that reigns when state policy makers lose sight of
Congress’s original vision of Chapter 9 as one component of an
integrated approach to municipal financial distress that
incorporates both state law and federal bankruptcy law. Part VII
discusses some of the open issues that remain in Chapter 9 after
the governance question is answered, and I conclude by
encouraging policy makers to consider the proper role of
Chapter 9 as they develop more robust mechanisms to
rehabilitate their cities.
II. The Delicate Balance of State and Federal Power Preserved in
Chapter 9: Does it Render Municipal Bankruptcy Useless?
Constitutional
concerns,
coupled
with
municipal
bankruptcy’s original limited goal of solving the holdout problem,
explain the somewhat skeletal nature of Chapter 9. The Tenth
Amendment limits the control that a federal court can exercise
over a municipality, and the Contracts Clause limits the ability of
a state to force a creditor of a city to accept less than what it is
owed.22 As a result, although today’s Chapter 9 is modeled more
closely on Chapter 11 than were its predecessor statutes,23 it
lacks many of the elements of Chapter 11 that give creditors
some control over the debtor.24 The structure of Chapter 9
22. See infra notes 205–06 and accompanying text (discussing the
constitutional implications of municipal bankruptcy).
23. See Lawrence P. King, Municipal Insolvency: The New Chapter IX of the
Bankruptcy Act, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1157–62 (1976) (explaining the 1976
amendments to Chapter 9’s predecessor statute).
24. See Dubrow, supra note 3, at 547 (“[U]nder Chapter 9 creditors have
fewer tools to intervene in the reorganization process than do creditors under
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appears to grant the governing body of a municipality in
Chapter 9 exclusive management of the municipality’s future
destiny.25 Chapter 9 does not require this state of affairs,
however. Congress did not design municipal bankruptcy law to
give a municipality unfettered control over its reorganization
process; rather, it carefully designed the law to respect each
state’s ability to control the financial rehabilitation of its cities.26
In this section, I will explain the major differences between
Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 and then discuss the prevailing
criticisms of Chapter 9.
A. Chapter 9 and Control over the Debtor and Its Property
Chapter 9 incorporates many elements of other types of
bankruptcy, Chapter 11 in particular. An automatic stay of all
actions against the debtor and the debtor’s property arises
immediately upon filing.27 The debtor must propose a plan of
adjustment, which is Chapter 9’s version of the Chapter 11 plan
of reorganization.28 The debtor may assume or reject executory
contracts, including collective bargaining agreements.29 The
municipality’s creditors vote on the plan, and the voting
requirements are similar to those found in Chapter 11.30 Like
Chapter 11, Chapter 9 contains a cramdown provision, which
Chapter 11.”).
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (limiting the power and jurisdiction of the
court particularly over the “political or governmental powers of the debtor”).
26. See id. § 903 (reserving state power to control municipalities).
27. See id. § 901(a) (incorporating the automatic stay provided by § 362);
see also id. § 922 (extending the stay to actions against an “officer or inhabitant
of the debtor that seeks to recover a claim against the debtor”).
28. See id. § 941 (requiring the debtor to file a plan for the adjustment of
debts).
29. See id. § 901(a) (incorporating § 365); see also King, supra note 23, at
1169 (explaining that labor contracts may be a partial cause of a municipality’s
financial problems); Barry Winograd, San Jose Revisited: A Proposal for
Negotiated Modification of Public Sector Bargaining Agreements Rejected Under
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 276–81 (1985)
(discussing the legislative history behind the inclusion of the right to reject
collective bargaining agreements in Chapter 9).
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating all of the voting
requirements of § 1126 except for those dealing with voting by holders of equity
interests in the debtor).
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provides that the plan can be imposed on nonconsenting creditors
if at least one class of creditors accepts the plan and the plan is
fair and equitable.31 These elements give a municipality some of
the important bankruptcy benefits available to business entities:
a stay of all collection actions, the ability to reject burdensome
contracts, and the ability to impose a plan on nonconsenting
creditors. In other ways, Chapter 9 is significantly different from
Chapter 11.
Chapter 9 explicitly respects state sovereignty. It eschews
any limitation on the state’s power “to control, by legislation or
otherwise, a municipality of or in such state in the exercise of the
political or governmental powers of such municipality,”32 but
limits this sovereignty by prohibiting states from passing laws
that would bind nonconsenting creditors to a plan of debt
adjustment.33 When Congress added this limitation to the
municipal bankruptcy chapter in 1946, it did so recognizing that
investors throughout the country held the bonds of many
municipalities.34 Therefore, even if, as the Court had held in
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,35 the Contracts
Clause did not prohibit a state plan of debt adjustment, Congress
believed that a uniform federal process for imposing a plan on
nonconsenting creditors was preferable to a mélange of state
processes.36 In further recognition that federal law cannot usurp
a state’s role in municipal oversight, Chapter 9 prevents the
bankruptcy court from interfering with a municipality’s political
31. See id. § 901 (incorporating the cramdown provisions of § 1129(b)(1)
and (b)(2)(A), (B)).
32. Id.
33. See id. (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of
indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not
consent to such composition.”). Congress added this limitation to overrule the
Supreme Court’s holding in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316
U.S. 502, 516 (1942), which upheld a state’s ability to impose a plan of
adjustment on a municipality’s nonconsenting creditors. See McConnell &
Picker, supra note 3, at 462 (explaining that Congress enacted § 903 to overrule
Faitoute); Tung, supra note 3, at 889 n.16 (discussing the legislative history of
the predecessor to § 903).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 79-2246, at 4 (1946).
35. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
36. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-2246, at 4 (1946) (“[B]ankruptcy law under which
bondholders of a municipality are required to surrender or cancel their
obligations should be uniform throughout the 48 states . . . .”).
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and governmental powers and from interfering with the
municipality’s use of its property.37
This respect for state sovereignty explains the remainder of
Chapter 9. The partial incorporation of Chapter 11 concepts
reflects the fact that the bankruptcy court, as an arm of the
federal government, must refrain from interfering with the
governance of a municipality.38 As a result, missing from
Chapter 9 are many of Chapter 11’s provisions designed to give
creditors some control over the Chapter 11 outcome. The default
rule in Chapter 11 is that the existing managers of the debtor
entity remain in control of the debtor as “debtor in possession.”39
At the request of a creditor or any other party in interest, the
court can replace the debtor in possession with a trustee if the
court finds that the corporate managers have engaged in certain
misconduct such as fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross
mismanagement.40 Although the courts view the appointment of a
Chapter 11 trustee as an extraordinary remedy,41 the threat of
such an appointment theoretically serves as a check on the
debtor’s behavior.42 Chapter 11 also allows a court to appoint an
examiner to investigate allegations of fraud and other misconduct
on the part of the debtor.43 Because Chapter 9 specifically
prohibits the bankruptcy court from interfering with any of the
37. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). The debtor may, however, consent to such
interference. See id. (explaining that inference is blocked “[n]otwithstanding any
power of the court, unless the debtor consents”).
38. See infra notes 216–17 and accompanying text (discussing Tenth
Amendment limitations in bankruptcy).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (defining “debtor in possession”); see also id. § 1107
(granting to the debtor in possession all of the rights and powers of a trustee).
40. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
41. In re Euro-Am. Lodging Corp., 365 B.R. 421, 426 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2007); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
42. See In re Euro-Am. Lodging Corp., 365 B.R. at 427–28 (discussing when
and why a trustee should be appointed). In the early years of Chapter 11,
commentators noted that despite these theoretical controls on management,
corporate management was rarely ousted in Chapter 11 cases, and thus the
debtor had excessive control over the proceedings. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code—First Installment, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 103 (1983)
(observing that creditors in the first three years of Chapter 11 practice rarely
used three tools often viewed as giving creditors control over the proceedings:
involuntary petitions, creditors’ committees, and creditor-proposed plans).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012).
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political or governmental powers of the debtor municipality,44 it
lacks these constraints on the debtor and prevents the court from
appointing a trustee or an examiner in a Chapter 9 case.45
The Chapter 9 mandate that the court not interfere with the
municipality’s management of its property is illustrated by the
absence of an estate in a Chapter 9 case. Absent from the list of
sections included in Chapter 9 is § 541, which provides that the
commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate that is
comprised of all “legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case.”46 The absence of
an estate, coupled with the Code’s prohibition against court
interference with any of the property or revenues of the
municipal debtor,47 ensures that neither the court nor any
creditor can determine how a municipal debtor uses its property.
No party in interest can object to the debtor municipality’s use or
disposition of such property; the debtor may use, lease, or sell it
in Chapter 9 without asking the court for permission.48
Other omissions from Chapter 9 reflect the congressional
decision to leave the management of an insolvent municipality to
the municipality itself and its state. Most notably, only the debtor
can propose a plan of adjustment.49 Creditors have no opportunity
to do so; therefore, the debtor’s exclusivity period is unlimited.50
Somewhat less importantly, given the small number of
involuntary bankruptcies,51 only the municipality itself may file
44. Id. § 904(1).
45. See id. § 901 (incorporating numerous Code provisions into Chapter 9
but omitting § 1104).
46. Id. § 541(a)(1); see also id. §§ 901, 902(1) (defining “property of the
estate” for Chapter 9 purposes as “property of the debtor”).
47. Id. § 904(2).
48. See id. § 363 (placing conditions on the debtor’s use, sale, and lease of
estate property); id. § 901 (omitting § 363 from the sections applicable in
Chapter 9).
49. See id. § 941 (giving the debtor the authority to file a plan of
adjustment).
50. See id. § 901 (omitting § 1121 from list of sections included in Chapter
9); see also id. § 1121(c) (granting parties in interest the authority to file a plan
of reorganization after the expiration of the debtor’s exclusivity period).
51. See Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions
and Why the Number is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 805 (2011) (“[A]
surprisingly small number of involuntary petitions are filed each year.”).
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for bankruptcy. There is no such thing as an involuntary
Chapter 9.52
Although the foregoing provisions are sometimes cited as
giving the municipal debtor excessive control over the bankruptcy
case,53 they should be viewed less as an effort to give the
management of the municipality exclusive control than to balance
the constitutional powers of the state and federal governments. A
common criticism of Chapter 9 is that, by excessive deference to
local control, Chapter 9 presumes that a municipality will exit
bankruptcy in the same form as it entered bankruptcy.54 A more
accurate approach to Chapter 9’s structure is to view Chapter 9
as a sometimes-necessary component of a state or local plan for
municipal financial recovery. Chapter 9 does not require a
municipality to exit bankruptcy in the same form as it entered
the process. Instead, Chapter 9 leaves governance decisions to
entities other than the creditors and the bankruptcy judge and
invites the state to provide such governance.55 The real
governance vacuum in Chapter 9 emerges when the state fails to
provide any direction for the financial rehabilitation of its cities.
Unlike
Chapter 11,56
Chapter 9
has
strict
entry
requirements.57 These eligibility requirements, which make the
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012) (authorizing involuntary petitions only in
Chapters 7 and 11).
53. See, e.g., Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 380 (stating that because
the court has no authority to intervene in a city’s governance, the same officials
that controlled the locality before the filing continue to manage it); Kordana,
supra note 3, at 1046 (describing Chapter 9 as having a “pro-debtor”
orientation).
54. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 297 (stating that once
a state has permitted a municipality to file for bankruptcy, the exercise of the
bankruptcy option lies completely in the debtor’s control); Kimhi, Solution,
supra note 16, at 380 (stating the same officials who managed the city prior to
bankruptcy do so during and after the bankruptcy); McConnell & Picker, supra
note 3, at 427 (identifying, as a premise of Chapter 9, that the municipality will
have the same “boundaries, resources, functions, and governing structure” after
bankruptcy that it did before filing for bankruptcy).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 903 (“This chapter does not limit or impair the power of
a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such
State . . . .”).
56. See id. § 109(d) (stating that any person who can file for Chapter 7 may
file for Chapter 11).
57. See id. § 109(c) (stating that to file under Chapter 9 the debtor must
meet five criteria).
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state the Chapter 9 gatekeeper,58 illustrate that Chapter 9 is
better viewed as a component of a state plan to resolve the
financial distress of its municipalities than an independent
alternative to state intervention.
A municipality may be a debtor under Chapter 9 only if it:
(1) is a municipality, (2) is insolvent, (3) desires to adjust its
debts, (4) has negotiated in good faith with its creditors or can
show that such negotiation would be futile, and (5) is specifically
authorized by its state to be a debtor under Chapter 9.59 In
addition, the court may dismiss the debtor’s petition if it finds
that the debtor did not file it in good faith.60 Chapter 9’s
eligibility requirements provide the governance functions that
further the goals of Chapter 9. The requirement that does so most
explicitly is the specific authorization requirement, which shows
the intent of Congress to give states the first opportunity to
resolve the financial distress of their municipalities and invite
the federal power to help if necessary. When states accept this
invitation by making Chapter 9 a component of a comprehensive
state oversight program, they provide governance that best
furthers Chapter 9’s primary goal of restoring municipalities to
financial viability by bringing together the state and the federal
government to do something that neither one could accomplish
alone. When states do not accept that invitation, Chapter 9 may
provide the debtor with only a fresh financial start. In those
states, the eligibility requirements allow the court to assess
whether the debtor should use Chapter 9 to obtain that fresh
start.
B. Does Chapter 9 “Work?”: A Survey of Recent Scholarship
Municipal bankruptcy scholarship comes in waves. In the
1930s, when widespread municipal defaults drove Congress to
pass the first municipal bankruptcy law, scholarship about
municipal bankruptcy focused on the desirability of a federal law
58. See id. § 109(c)(2) (“An entity may be a debtor under Chapter 9 of this
title if such entity . . . is specifically authorized . . . by state law, or by a
governmental officer . . . .”).
59. Id. § 109(c).
60. Id. § 921(c).
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to overcome the inability of states to comprehensively resolve the
financial distress of their cities and the desired components of
such a law.61 Scholarship about municipal bankruptcy waned
until the 1970s when New York City’s financial crisis led
Congress to amend the municipal bankruptcy chapter.62 The
scholarship from the 1970s until 1990 focused primarily on the
various amendments to the municipal bankruptcy law and how
they would enable larger cities to file.63
Beginning in the 1990s, scholars began to question both the
wisdom of a federal municipal bankruptcy chapter and the
efficacy of the existing law. Authors in this post-1990 era of
Chapter 9 scholarship concur that Chapter 9 is a poor tool for
resolving the financial problems facing municipalities in large
part because of its lack of governance controls over municipal
debtors.64
In this section, I summarize the post-1990 scholarly debate
in order to refocus it. Although the recent Chapter 9 filings have
exposed numerous questions about how Chapter 9 should work,65
the open questions in Chapter 9 do not arise from the governance
deficiencies identified by the post-1990 authors. I discuss the
governance concerns of these authors below before I turn, in Part
IV, to a discussion of the history of Chapter 9 to illustrate that
Congress designed Chapter 9 to assist, rather than replace, states
in resolving municipal financial distress.

61. See infra Part III (discussing the goal-oriented governance of
bankruptcy law).
62. See generally Dubrow, supra note 3, at 545; infra notes 265–76 and
accompanying text.
63. See Robert S. Amdursky, The 1988 Municipal Bankruptcy
Amendments: History, Purposes, and Effects, 22 URB. LAW. 1, 2–4 (1990)
(describing the history of the amendments and their purpose); see also infra
notes 265–85 and accompanying text (discussing the amendments and
scholarship).
64. See infra notes 66–121 and accompanying text (discussing the post1990 scholarship regarding municipal bankruptcy).
65. Infra Part V.
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1. Is Chapter 9 Based on a Faulty Premise?

Michael McConnell and Randal Picker wrote the first post1990 academic municipal bankruptcy article. In their expansive
article, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy,66 they criticized both the limited goals of
Chapter 9 and its efficacy in achieving those goals.67 When
McConnell and Picker wrote their article, most of the generalpurpose municipalities that had filed for bankruptcy were small
cities seeking to escape the collection of large judgments against
them and all of those cases were dismissed.68 The only city of any
size that had filed was Bridgeport, Connecticut, and its filing had
been dismissed for failure to meet the Code’s entry
requirements.69 Both New York and Cleveland had experienced
significant financial difficulties that were due in large part to
municipal mismanagement, and neither one resorted to
Chapter 9 to solve its problems.70 McConnell and Picker’s
prescriptions for a better municipal bankruptcy chapter were
therefore based on two observations: that very few generalpurpose municipalities file for bankruptcy and the ones that do
are very small, and that the one that needed reorganization,
Bridgeport, was not permitted to reorganize in bankruptcy.71
According to McConnell and Picker, the underlying premise
of Chapter 9 is flawed. They posit that Chapter 9 is based on the
66. See generally McConnell & Picker, supra note 3.
67. See id. at 427 (“[W]e suggest that bankruptcy law could serve more
ambitious purposes than mere debt adjustment . . . .”).
68. See id. at 471 (discussing the major cities to file bankruptcy up to that
point and noting that Bridgeport, Connecticut, was the largest city to file);
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BANKRUPTCIES,
DEFAULTS, AND OTHER LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES 8–10
(1985), http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/policy/a-99.pdf (giving an
overview of the major cities to file for bankruptcy).
69. See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991)
(holding that the city did not prove that it was insolvent).
70. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 472.
71. See id. at 470–71 (discussing the municipal bankruptcy filings between
1938 and 1972). In the more than two decades since McConnell and Picker
wrote, few municipalities of any size have filed, and other authors have cited
this as evidence of Chapter 9’s ineffectiveness in restoring cities to fiscal health.
See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 16, at 881 (“Currently, the Bankruptcy Code
seems to be of limited use.”).
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belief that “all the cities need is relief from their present
creditors.”72 From that foundation, they reason that because
Chapter 9 assumes that “the city will emerge from bankruptcy in
the same form . . . with which it entered bankruptcy,” Chapter 9
does not support or encourage the efficient reorganization of
cities.73 As a result, municipal bankruptcy provides only a fresh
start for cities, and it does not even do that very well because by
allowing a city to keep all of its assets and discharge its debts, it
creates the moral hazard of permitting a city to devote its
resources to itself while escaping its debts.74 McConnell and
Picker compare the fresh start goal to the Chapter 11 goal of
efficient reconfiguration of assets and find the fresh start, as
applied to municipalities, to be unsatisfying.75
Others have repeated the concern that because all Chapter 9
does is grant a fresh start to a city, it is not a useful
rehabilitation tool. Those who express this concern contend that
Chapter 9 assumes no operational restructuring. Michelle Wilde
Anderson presented municipal dissolution as an option that
states should consider in resolving the distress of cities.76 She
based her contention that bankruptcy and dissolution are
“independent measures” on the assumption that municipal
bankruptcy must preserve a municipality’s broken form.77
Clayton Gillette presented his criticisms of Chapter 9 as a set of
concerns that the parallel state and federal systems for resolving
municipal financial distress may lead to undesirable strategic
behavior on the part of municipalities,78 a criticism based on the
72. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 494; see also David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV.
1063, 1074 (2013) [hereinafter Skeel, Is Bankruptcy the Answer] (making a
similar point in supporting a bankruptcy mechanism for states).
73. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 427.
74. Id. at 476.
75. Id. at 469–70.
76. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1365
(2012) [hereinafter Anderson, Dissolving Cities].
77. Id. at 1384–85.
78. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 319–20 (“[C]urrent
local officials are likely . . . to discount the effects of future higher credit costs in
favor of the political benefits of favoring residents.”). Because a state can limit
its municipalities’ access to bankruptcy, the only likely result of a strategic
threat to file might be its impact as a catalyst to legislative action. Infra notes
380–82 and accompanying text.
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observation that “the underlying assumption [of Chapter 9]
appears to be that localities should be preserved in their current
form, free from judicial reorganization.”79 As an example of
strategic behavior, he presents the possibility of a municipality
that, when faced with the choice of a state bailout that would
require structural changes to its operations, might choose
bankruptcy instead, which would shift the losses to creditors and
allow the municipality to operate without effecting needed
structural reform.80
Omer Kimhi likewise begins with the Chapter 11 comparison
to identify deficiencies in Chapter 9.81 Underlying his criticism is
his view that Chapter 9 is based on the assumption that once a
city’s financial hardship is resolved through the bankruptcy
process, the city can be rehabilitated for the benefit of both its
citizens and its creditors.82 Several years later, he described
Chapter 9 as “a solution in search of a problem,” in part because
it does “little to address the root causes of the economic
deterioration” of cities.83
The post-1990 authors saw Chapter 9 as a puzzle. Although
an insolvent municipality is an entity that should be restructured
both financially and operationally in order to succeed postbankruptcy, the goal of Chapter 9 appears to be a fresh financial
start, which is the goal that bankruptcy has for individuals.
Bankruptcy cannot force an individual to change her habits, but
it can enable stakeholders in an entity to force changes in the
debtor entity’s corporate structure.84 Therefore, there appears to
79. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 292.
80. See id. at 286 (“[I]f bankruptcy is a plausible option for distressed
municipalities . . . then local officials may use the threat of bankruptcy to reduce
the conditions that states place on a proposed bailout.”). Given the power of each
state to prevent its municipalities from filing for bankruptcy, it is unlikely that
such a strategic use would be successful. See infra Part VI (discussing
Pennsylvania’s rejection of Harrisburg’s attempt to use bankruptcy in a
strategic manner).
81. See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal
Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 651 (2008) [hereinafter Kimhi, Reviving
Cities] (“Similar to chapter 11’s procedures, chapter 9 offers two routes for the
plan’s confirmation . . . .”).
82. Id. at 654.
83. Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 380.
84. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 470 (“In the case of business
corporations, we readily recognize that the entity’s size and scope of operations
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be a mismatch between the goal of Chapter 9 and the governance
that it provides: the identified goal allows for no bankruptcy
governance over a debtor who may desperately need appropriate
restructuring governance.85
The authors propose to solve their puzzle in two ways: add
the missing piece by providing for more robust judicial
supervision over Chapter 9 debtors86 or scrap the puzzle
altogether and leave the resolution of municipal financial distress
entirely in state hands.87 Below, I discuss both these
prescriptions and the problems inherent in both.
2. Does Chapter 9 Give Too Much Power to the Debtor?
One way to solve the governance problem identified above
would be to grant the bankruptcy courts enhanced powers in
Chapter 9. Authors who have found the fresh start goal to be
unsatisfactory suggest that a municipal bankruptcy regime
should force the efficient reconfiguration of a city.88 If a
municipality is more like an entity than an individual, they
reason, then perhaps Chapter 9 should be refashioned to force
structural changes at the municipal level. Some scholars who
have written about Chapter 9 since 1990 reject the fresh start
goal and its corresponding absence of debtor governance and urge
that Chapter 9 should encourage the efficient reconfiguration of a

can be changed, and even that the corporation can be liquidated altogether.”).
85. See id. (noting that while bankruptcy law can dismember a private
corporation, “what may be surprising is that we do not dismember municipal
corporations either”); Schragger, supra note 16, at 881 (noting that municipal
bankruptcy is of limited use because it “does not contemplate the kinds of
reorganizations that are possible on the private side”).
86. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 494 (“We have suggested that
a more powerful bankruptcy court, grounded in state rather than federal law,
would better serve the purposes of bankruptcy and improve the lot of financially
troubled cities.”).
87. See id. (“[I]t serves little use . . . by restricting state laws directed at
solving the holdout problem, [it] even impedes the ability of states to institute
superior schemes for dealing with cities that have gone broke.”).
88. See, e.g., id. at 482–83 (arguing that the “fresh start” rehabilitation goal
is insufficient and that municipal liquidation is a feasible and appropriate
alternative).
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municipality’s structure, just as Chapter 11 does for business
entities.89
To support their position that Chapter 9 assumes that the
structure of a city will remain the same after discharge as it was
before filing, several authors point to the limited powers that
Chapter 9 grants to the bankruptcy court.90 Because of these
limited powers, these critics contend that Chapter 9 grants
excessive powers to the debtor itself, reducing the chances of a
successful reorganization because the same elected officials who
ran the city poorly will continue in office during and after the
bankruptcy.91 Moreover, those elected officials are likely to
refrain from making unpopular adjustments, such as tax
increases, in order to remain in their positions.92 Likewise,
because only the debtor may file a plan of debt adjustment, some
fear that the municipality retains excessive leverage over its
creditors in that the creditors are faced with a choice of either
“languishing in bankruptcy or approving the municipality’s
plan.”93
Because McConnell and Picker believe that Chapter 9 should
more explicitly foster the reorganization of a city, they identify
Chapter 9’s fundamental flaw as its limitations on the

89. See id. (stating that when a municipality cannot pay its bills,
something more than a fresh start may be necessary).
90. See id. at 472 (explaining that the Code explicitly prohibits courts from
interfering with a municipal debtor’s political or governmental powers);
Schragger, supra note 16, at 881 (observing that Chapter 9 does not allow a
judge to order the involuntary dissolution of a city); Tung, supra note 3, at 898
(stating that Chapter 9 gives a municipal debtor a “hefty club to wield over
creditors, without giving creditors much in the way of protective mechanisms
that are available in corporate and individual bankruptcy”).
91. See Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 380–81 (explaining that the
bankruptcy court has no authority to affect the control exercised by municipal
officials); Kordana, supra note 3, at 1046 (describing Chapter 9 as having a “prodebtor” orientation); McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 472–73 (explaining
that a city’s paralyzing financial difficulties are often the result of a poorly
functioning city government); Skeel, Is Bankruptcy the Answer, supra note 72
(explaining that the existing decisionmakers retain control in a Chapter 9).
92. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 320–21 (positing that
local officials will value the political benefits of favoring resident interest groups
like public employees over the financial benefits of favoring nonresident
bondholders).
93. Kordana, supra note 3, at 1041.

GOALS AND GOVERNANCE

423

bankruptcy court’s powers.94 From this premise, they reason that
an effective bankruptcy system should give courts the power to
take actions to restructure a city. Among the powers that
McConnell and Picker recommend are the power to order the levy
and collection of taxes, the power to order reductions in wasteful
municipal expenditures, the power to seize income streams for
bond repayment purposes, and the power to sell some municipal
property.95 They cite this last power as particularly important
because they identify the ability of a city to discharge debt while
retaining its assets as “the principal source of the moral hazard
problem in municipal bankruptcy.”96
Gillette echoes these suggestions as a solution to the
possibility of a municipality using the threat of municipal
bankruptcy in a strategic fashion. A bankruptcy court could
refuse to confirm a plan of adjustment that did not provide for tax
increases,97 but Gillette argues that Congress should give the
courts more explicit powers over city governance. He suggests
that the bankruptcy court be given the power to impose
adjustments to both taxes and spending in order to deter
municipalities from seeking Chapter 9 protection to avoid making
politically unpalatable choices that would impose the costs of
financial distress on city residents rather than creditors.98
Gillette’s strategic bankruptcy argument is similar to McConnell
94. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 479 (arguing that courts in
bankruptcy cases cannot successfully operate without “far-reaching power”).
95. Id. at 475–76.
96. Id. Kevin Kordana doubts that municipal bankruptcy presents a
significant moral hazard problem. See Kordana, supra note 3, at 1085–89
(offering empirical evidence that defaults on government debt remain rare
despite the fact that creditor collection remedies against government debtors are
limited because of the “dynamic game” aspects of municipal borrowing).
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012) (authorizing the court to confirm a plan
of adjustment if it is in the best interest of creditors); id. § 1129(b)(2) (requiring
that a plan be fair and equitable towards an impaired class of creditors that
opposes the plan and incorporated into Chapter 9 by § 901); see also Fano v.
Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 565–66 (9th Cir. 1940) (refusing
to confirm a plan of adjustment that did not raise taxes and holding that the
plan was neither fair and equitable nor in the best interest of creditors).
98. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 326 (maintaining that
such “resource adjustments” will effectively deter strategic use of municipal
bankruptcy where “lack of political will rather than destitution explains local
resistance to resource adjustments”).
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and Picker’s moral hazard argument; in both articles, the authors
express the fear that if too much discretion is left in a municipal
debtor’s hands, municipal debtors will seek an easy out that will
allow them to escape debts without making necessary structural
changes.99
Inherent in these criticisms of Chapter 9 is the observation
that if a city files for bankruptcy, the city is in complete control of
its destiny, free of external supervision. Gillette contends that
once a state has permitted bankruptcy, the decision to file is
exclusively within the control of the municipality.100 Chapter 9
does not require this result, however. The Code limits the
bankruptcy court’s power over the municipal debtor and its
property,101 but in doing so it refrains from imposing limits on a
state’s powers over its municipalities.102 Rather than leaving
power in the hands of a debtor municipality, these sections, when
read together with the requirement that a state specifically
authorize its municipalities to file, allow the state to exercise as
much control as it desires.103
McConnell, Picker, and Gillette recognized the legal
impediments to their suggestions. The Code specifically prohibits
the bankruptcy court from interfering with any of the
municipality’s political powers,104 but the authors suggested that
this statutory restriction be relaxed.105 Nevertheless, they
99. Id. at 297; McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 477.
100. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 329.
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (mandating that the bankruptcy court cannot
“interfere” with the “use or enjoyment” of any “property” or “revenues” of the
debtor municipality).
102. See id. § 903 (“This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a
State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in
the exercise of the political or governmental powers of such municipality . . . .”).
103. McConnell and Picker recognize this, but discuss state intervention as
an alternative, rather than a complement to, Chapter 9. See McConnell &
Picker, supra note 3, at 462, 479 (acknowledging that Chapter 9 “explicitly
protects the rights of the state to control its political subdivisions” but
maintaining that “federal bankruptcy is an alternative to state reform rather
than supplemental to it”).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 904.
105. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 297 (arguing for the
repeal of the “strictures” of Section 904 in order to explicitly authorize judicial
discretion over municipal resource adjustments); McConnell & Picker, supra
note 3, at 474–75 (arguing that the Code should be reformed to permit
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conceded that such powers might violate the Tenth Amendment
and concluded that perhaps a federal bankruptcy chapter is
unnecessary.106 Their conclusion that states should be empowered
to enact municipal bankruptcy regimes, however, raises
Contracts Clause issues.107
3. Must Chapter 9 and State Intervention Run on Parallel Tracks?
The authors discussed above described state intervention and
federal municipal bankruptcy as parallel independent systems.
McConnell and Picker stated this explicitly by describing
bankruptcy as “an alternative to state reform rather than
supplemental to it.”108 This view of Chapter 9 and state
intervention as mutually exclusive alternatives is consistent with
some authors’ characterization of Chapter 9 as a way for a city to
obtain easy debt relief without making the changes necessary to
both provide essential services and avoid financial ruin in the
future.109 If that is the case, Chapter 9 is of course undesirable.
No one wants a city to go through the expense and bad press of
bankruptcy just to emerge from bankruptcy in the same
distressed form in which it entered.
The superior ability of each state to remedy its cities’
financial distress is beyond question. A state can make structural
changes that can prevent or alleviate municipal financial
distress, something a bankruptcy court cannot do. A state can
intervene in a city’s financial distress by establishing a financial
bankruptcy judges to exercise more discretion over municipal taxing and
spending powers).
106. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 479 (“It may well be, therefore,
that federal municipal bankruptcy law is even more fundamentally
misconceived than at first appeared: there shouldn’t be any.”).
107. Id. at 479–80. This, of course, would likely violate the Contracts Clause.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . make any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
108. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 479.
109. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 291–92 (suggesting
that the objective of Chapter 9 is “simply to allow a financially distressed city to
restructure its monetary obligations, not to restructure the city government or
liquidate its assets for the benefit of creditors”); Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra
note 81, at 653 (stating that bankruptcy allows municipalities to avoid paying
their creditors in full by “refusing to maximize their tax-raising capacity”).
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control board or by extending loans,110 and can act to mitigate the
causes of municipal distress, such as suburbanization, by
reforming the state tax structure.111 A state can dissolve a
municipality in order to merge it into another112 and can appoint
a receiver to impose fiscal discipline on a municipality.113
Recognizing this superiority, each author’s view of the
relationship between state intervention and Chapter 9 influenced
his prescriptions for a superior system for the resolution of
financial distress. For example, Gillette’s article explored the
interaction between Chapter 9 and state intervention; in fact, he
described his contribution to the literature as an explanation of
how the two systems interact using principles of fiscal
federalism.114 The interaction he described, however, assumed
that the two systems run on parallel, rather than intersecting,
tracks.115 After discussing a city’s motivations to choose one
system over the other, Gillette ultimately suggested a grant of
greater powers to the bankruptcy court that would mirror those
that could be exercised by the state in order to prevent strategic
uses of bankruptcy by municipalities.116 Strategic use, therefore,
110. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 310.
111. See Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 387–88 (explaining that a state
can require suburban residents to bear some of a city’s tax burden).
112. See Anderson, Dissolving Cities, supra note 76, at 1375–84 (offering a
survey of state law designed to facilitate municipal dissolution and merger);
McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 481, 485 (stating that “[m]unicipal
corporations can be liquidated” and that “some states might choose to merge the
dissolved city into surrounding jurisdictions”).
113. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 473 (noting the historical
success that appointed receivers have had in “disciplining municipal budgets”).
Laws providing for the appointment of receivers are highly controversial in part
because they deprive the local electorate of their choice of elected officials, and
they tend to affect cities with large minority populations. See Michelle Wilde
Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State Takeovers
of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 582 (2012) [hereinafter
Anderson, Radical Experimentation] (maintaining that receivers “can enflame
antagonism between state and local actors” and “disempower a beleaguered
local electorate”).
114. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 286.
115. See id. at 293–94 (discussing the effects of Chapter 9 on local
municipalities without reference to state intervention).
116. See id. at 326 (explaining that municipal leaders would be less likely to
threaten to file for Chapter 9 in order to extract state bailouts if they knew that
the bankruptcy judge had the same power to impose resource adjustments that
the state did).
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is possible only because Chapter 9 lacks the debtor governance
that a state can provide. According to Gillette, this problem can
be remedied by giving the two systems similar debtor governance
provisions.117
In McConnell and Picker’s view, the mutual exclusivity of
state oversight and bankruptcy meant that there was a
governance vacuum that excluded coordination between the state
intervention process and the federal bankruptcy process.118 They
discussed several examples of state oversight that they
characterized as successful.119 Their prescription was to allow for
parallel systems, but to allow a state that was inclined to
implement an intervention scheme to opt entirely out of
Chapter 9. Their opt-out went further than the opt-out that
already exists in the Code, however. They explained that the
constitutional objections to state-imposed bankruptcy regimes
might easily be overcome by amending the Code to permit the
states to impose involuntary debt adjustments, thus allowing
states to not only opt-out of the Code entirely, as they can now,
but to provide the same benefits that the Code provides to their
cities in doing so.120 McConnell and Picker believed that one
benefit of a state-run bankruptcy regime would be that the state
could commit its resources to the financial rehabilitation of a city
as part of the process.121
Writing after the Orange County bankruptcy, Frederick
Tung provided a different perspective on Chapter 9 governance.
Of the post-1990 municipal bankruptcy scholars, Tung saw the
117. See id. (“[T]he ideal remedy is to make the level of local officials’
authority inside and outside bankruptcy more similar.”).
118. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 479 (arguing that, because
federal bankruptcy is an alternative rather than a supplement to state reform,
“no one is in a position to coordinate state assistance”).
119. See id. at 473–74 (listing receiverships initiated in New York City,
Chelsea, Massachusetts, and Ecorse, Michigan as “notable success[es]”). Twenty
years later, however, some of these state intervention schemes have proven less
successful than they had hoped. See infra notes 359–60 and accompanying text
(discussing the mixed municipal recovery results reached under Pennsylvania’s
receivership statute).
120. See id. at 479–80 (explaining that such a scheme would not violate the
Contracts Clause if it were to operate only prospectively, because its terms
would be incorporated into future contracts).
121. See id. at 479 (insisting that states could “lend [their] credit” or their
“state resources” to distressed municipalities).
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greatest role for the state in the Chapter 9 process. At the time
Orange County filed for bankruptcy, California authorized its
municipalities to file for bankruptcy free of any restrictions in
addition to those imposed by the Bankruptcy Code.122 Tung
recognized both that early cooperation between a city in financial
trouble and its state is necessary, but that sometimes such
cooperation, if it comes at all, comes too late to avert a financial
disaster.123 Tung’s suggestions for California involved increased
gubernatorial involvement in municipal bankruptcy by requiring
the governor to approve all such bankruptcies.124 As I will explain
below in Part V, California has notably declined the invitation to
exercise governance over its cities in financial distress.125
In a perfect world, a state could prevent and ameliorate the
financial distress of its cities without resort to federal law. The
world is not perfect, however. States are prohibited from
imposing binding plans of adjustment on nonconsenting creditors
by the Contracts Clause of the Constitution and by Supreme
Court precedent.126 As a result, state-supervised municipal debt
adjustment plans must win the consent of all creditors. Moreover,
some states lack intervention programs;127 others may implement
those programs only when a general-purpose municipality in that
state falls into financial distress.128 As such, they may not provide
the proactive monitoring assistance that prevents cities from
falling into financial ruin.129 Even states that have intervention

122. See Tung, supra note 3, at 891–92 (discussing Sections 43739 and
53760 of the California Code and concluding that they “provide fairly broad
authorization for California municipal entities to file for bankruptcy”).
123. Id. at 907.
124. See id. at 921–23 (providing a menu of conditions that could be
attached to such a filing depending on the needs of each city).
125. Infra Part V.
126. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (explaining the constitutional
limitations placed on state power to affect unilateral adjustments of municipal
debt).
127. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 9–10 (2013) [hereinafter PEW REPORT] (listing only nineteen
states that have intervention programs).
128. See infra notes 338–51 and accompanying text (explaining how
intervention programs in Rhode Island and Michigan were enacted reactively to
deal with existing municipal distress).
129. See John C. Philo, Local Government Fiscal Emergencies and the
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programs may find that such programs are not as effective as
originally hoped.130
The post-1990 authors expressed important concerns about
Chapter 9. Their core concern is that Chapter 9 does not provide
debtor governance that is sufficient to effect structural changes in
a distressed city. Their perception that Chapter 9 has more of a
fresh start purpose than a rehabilitative purpose magnifies this
concern. In the next section, I will discuss the relationship
between bankruptcy governance and bankruptcy goals, and
assert that Chapter 9 allows appropriate governance over
municipal debtors by inviting states to provide the missing
governance.
III. Bankruptcy’s Goal-Oriented Governance
Bankruptcy governance is inextricably linked to bankruptcy
goals. As a result, one cannot develop effective governance
mechanisms in any chapter of the Code if that chapter’s goals are
unclear.131 If the goals of a municipal bankruptcy chapter are
unclear, then Chapter 9, when viewed as a freestanding
municipal rehabilitation mechanism, appears to have a
governance problem. When Chapter 9 acts alone, it can give a
municipality only a fresh start. Yet the only other debtors who
receive a bankruptcy fresh start are individuals, and the Code
does not govern them in the way that it governs entities. A
municipality is not an individual, however. Because a
municipality is an entity that provides necessary and desirable

Disenfranchisement of Victims of the Global Recession, 13 J.L. SOC’Y 71, 82
(2011) (explaining that only a handful of states have general legislation
enabling financial oversight of distressed cities); cf. Kimhi, Solution, supra note
16, at 385 (promoting a proactive supervision system that would not only help to
rehabilitate distressed localities, but also “prevent local fiscal stress from
becoming a crisis”).
130. See infra notes 350–53 and accompanying text (describing a number of
efficacy and impact objections to state intervention programs).
131. See Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of
Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103,
104–05 (1998) (explaining, in the business reorganization context, that
“governance questions are inextricably bound up in the broader policy question
of what goals Chapter 11 should seek to promote”).
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public services for its residents,132 it may require the kinds of
external governance that can be exercised over a corporate debtor
in bankruptcy. Yet a municipality is not analogous to a corporate
entity; in every American state, a municipality is a subdivision of
its state,133 and it is therefore not owned and controlled like a
private business entity.
Bankruptcy does not have one exclusive goal. Every
bankruptcy case, regardless of the chapter under which it is filed,
aims to resolve the claims of the debtor’s multiple competing
creditors and relieve the debtor from its financial past.134 Beyond
that, the bankruptcy goals for individuals and entities diverge. In
this section, I discuss the different types of bankruptcy goals and
governance in order to clarify the governance that Congress
intended when it enacted a municipal bankruptcy chapter.
A. Bankruptcy Governance over Individuals
Consumer bankruptcy law aims to provide a fresh start to
the honest but unfortunate debtor.135 An individual manages
herself, and no mechanism, whether provided by bankruptcy law
or by some other law, can replace the management of an
individual. Bankruptcy’s governance controls over individuals,
therefore, consist of mechanisms designed to ensure that only
“worthy” debtors will receive bankruptcy relief.136 When an
132. Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 29 (1998); Clayton
P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 968 (1991).
133. See SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 1.02
(2d ed. 1997) (“It has been well recognized that constitutionally as well as
historically, local entities are merely subdivisions of the state.”); see also Gerald
E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (1980)
(explaining that a city has only those powers that are delegated to it by its state
government).
134. TABB, supra note 2, § 1.1.
135. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that
bankruptcy law “gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for
distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt”).
136. See, e.g., Richard E. Coulson, Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy: An
Evolving Philosophy of Debtor Qualification for Bankruptcy Discharge, 62 ALB.
L. REV. 467, 477 (1998) (describing the “debtor’s honesty in disclosing and
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individual files for bankruptcy, these governance controls operate
both to limit the type of relief,137 if any, for which the debtor is
eligible and to deny relief to debtors who engage in some
wrongdoing during the bankruptcy case.138 Opening bankruptcy
only to worthy debtors does nothing, however, to ensure that the
post-bankruptcy individual debtor is better managed than her
pre-bankruptcy self.139
One way in which the Code attempts to govern the postbankruptcy behavior of individual debtors is by barring repeat
petitions. An individual cannot file for bankruptcy if she has been
in bankruptcy within six months before filing her petition if the
earlier petition was dismissed because of the debtor’s
uncooperative behavior in the case.140 In addition, the Code
denies discharge to individuals who file too frequently. An
individual debtor will be denied a discharge if she has received
one in another bankruptcy case filed within two to eight years
before the second petition, depending on the chapter under which
both the first and second bankruptcies were filed.141
turning over assets, and general cooperation with the bankruptcy process” as
constant themes in the evolution of the discharge); Margaret Howard, A Theory
of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1052 (1987)
(describing bankruptcy law as being “more accurately interpreted as a series of
provisions reflecting ad hoc definitions of what is honest or worthy in particular
situations”).
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012) (subjecting individual debtors to means
testing and denying Chapter 7 relief to an individual deemed to have sufficient
income to fund a Chapter 13 plan).
138. See id. § 727 (denying individual debtors a Chapter 7 discharge for
misbehavior before or during the bankruptcy case).
139. See David A. Lander, Essay, A Snapshot of Two Systems That Are
Trying to Help People in Financial Trouble, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 161, 174
(1999) (maintaining that bankruptcy does little to alter the “personal
characteristics and life circumstances” that cause repeated insolvency).
140. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) (prohibiting an individual from filing if she
voluntarily dismissed the earlier case after a request for relief from the
automatic stay).
141. See id. § 727(a)(8) (denying a Chapter 7 discharge to an individual who
was granted a Chapter 7 or 11 discharge in a case commenced within eight
years before the petition was filed); id. § 727(a)(9) (denying a discharge to an
individual who received a Chapter 12 or 13 discharge in a case commenced
within six years before the petition); id. § 1328(f) (denying Chapter 13 discharge
to a debtor who has received a Chapter 13 discharge in a case filed within two
years before the date of the petition or who has received a discharge under
Chapters 7, 11, or 12 in a case filed within four years before the petition).
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Bankruptcy governance over individuals is therefore
exercised through access and discharge restrictions. These
restrictions are the only viable restrictions; there is no other way
for the Code to dictate individual behavior. Bankruptcy will give
an individual debtor relief from her pre-bankruptcy financial
woes, but only if the debtor manages her affairs in a way that is
deemed acceptable under the Code.142 The access restrictions
encourage the debtor to exercise good financial governance over
herself because they limit the frequency with which an individual
can receive bankruptcy relief.
B. Bankruptcy Governance over Entities
The Code itself provides governance controls over the
individual debtor. As I will discuss in this section, although the
judge in a Chapter 11 case has more governance powers over the
case itself than she does in a Chapter 9 case, non-bankruptcy
forces govern the structural rehabilitation of the debtor entity.
Unlike an individual debtor, who is governed only by herself, an
entity is governed by a number of individuals whose behavior is
influenced by the contracts the entity has entered into, the
market in which the entity operates, and laws that impose
fiduciary duties on entity actors.143 Bankruptcy law affects these
elements of corporate governance when they conflict with
bankruptcy goals.144 The debtor controls included in Chapter 11
therefore provide a bankruptcy substitute for these market and
contractual controls that affect corporate governance outside of
bankruptcy.145
The goal of business bankruptcy law is to maximize the value
of an entity for its creditors and other parties affected by the
142. See Coulson, supra note 136, at 518–19 (identifying values like
“orderliness, morality and respect” on which “an open credit economy depends”
as the foundations of consumer bankruptcy).
143. See Frost, supra note 131, at 110 (describing the conceptual framework
of the corporate governance structure).
144. See id. at 112–13 (noting that the “automatic stay deprives creditors of
their contractual controls over managers” and that market discipline is
irrelevant when managers are fighting for the very survival of their business).
145. See id. at 113 (explaining that these Chapter 11 controls substitute for
market and contractual governance).
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entity’s operations. A business entity that has no chance of
survival will liquidate, either in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, and an
entity that can survive will reorganize under Chapter 11, on the
theory that an entity is worth more to its creditors as a going
concern than it is in a piecemeal liquidation.146 Underlying
corporate bankruptcy is the theory that a corporation can be
reorganized to maximize its going-concern value for the benefit of
its creditors, and if such reorganization is impossible, the
corporate assets can be liquidated and distributed to the entity’s
creditors.147
The court and the debtor’s creditors have several powers in
Chapter 11 that they lack in Chapter 9. These powers further the
goal of maximizing the value of the business debtor’s assets.
Bankruptcy law does not mandate the results of a successful
Chapter 11; it facilitates them.148 In the paradigmatic
Chapter 11, creditors receive shares of the reorganized
corporation in exchange for their claims,149 but the Code does not
require this result. Likewise, a plan can provide for the merger or
dissolution of the debtor corporation, but again, the Code does not
require any structural change.150 If internal corporate governance
146. See MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN
BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (4th ed. 2012) (explaining that
reorganization is desirable based on the premise that preserving the entity’s
going concern value is better for society than liquidating the entity); Elizabeth
Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336,
350 (1993) (explaining the goals of business bankruptcy).
147. See Warren, supra note 146, at 350 (outlining the economic rationale
underlying the methods employed by the Code to preserve value in a failing
company).
148. See Levitin, supra note 16, at 1445 (explaining that all bankruptcy can
do to help a firm whose business is the sale of “whale oil, corset stays, bustles,
flash bulbs, slide rules [or] floppy disks” is to provide it with an orderly way to
liquidate its assets and a “dignified funeral”).
149. See Richard E. Mendales, Intensive Care for the Public Corporation:
Securities Law, Corporate Governance, and the Reorganization Process, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 979, 1013–14 (2008) (explaining how Chapter 11 facilitates
changes in corporate structure through plan confirmation and that the Code
does not mandate any particular new control structure).
150. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (2012) (permitting a plan to include
“merger or consolidation of the debtor” without mandating that such steps must
be taken). The fact that these structural changes are largely left in the debtor’s
hands has led over the years to calls for enhanced judicial controls in Chapter
11 such as the mandatory appointment of a trustee or examiner, the reduction
in time during which the debtor must propose a plan of reorganization, and an
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can result in a successful going concern, the end result of a
Chapter 11 will not be a sale of the business. If it cannot, the
judge will honor a request to sell the assets to the person who can
best maximize their value. Therefore, creditors in Chapter 11 can
object to a debtor’s sale of its property,151 and they may propose
their own plan of reorganization if the debtor does not do so
within a prescribed time period.152
A major concern of the post-1990 municipal bankruptcy
authors was the inability of the court to replace a municipality’s
management in Chapter 9.153 In Chapter 11, a court may do so by
appointing a trustee, but courts do so infrequently. Although a
party in interest can ask the court to appoint a trustee in a
Chapter 11 case and the court must do so if it finds that the
debtor’s management has acted in a way that is fraudulent,
dishonest, or incompetent, or that it has grossly mismanaged the
debtor’s affairs,154 such an appointment is considered an
“extreme,” not a routine, remedy.155 Chapter 11, both by statute
and in practice, embodies a presumption that existing
management will remain in control of the debtor. The debtor can,
at least initially, remain in control of its operations, use and sell
property in the ordinary course of its business, and retain the
exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization.156 Even when
early determination of plan feasibility. See generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The
Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REV. 791, 822–61 (1993) [hereinafter Tabb, The
Future] (weighing the merits of twelve reform proposals, including trustee
appointment, expedited stay relief, and required threshold feasibility findings).
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (requiring court review of a disposition in property
by the bankruptcy estate when a creditor objects after having received notice of
the pending disposition).
152. See id. § 1121(c) (allowing a number of creditors to file a plan of
adjustment when certain conditions are met).
153. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (summarizing McConnell
and Picker’s argument that the “fresh start” goal implied by Chapter 9’s refusal
to allow for removal of municipal leadership renders Chapter 9 ineffective in
dealing with municipal insolvency).
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (listing the conditions for court-ordered
appointment of a trustee).
155. See In re William A. Smith Const. Co., Inc., 77 B.R. 124, 126 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1987) (“[T]he appointment of a trustee is an extraordinary remedy . . .
which should not be made lightly.”). See generally Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing
Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 KAN. L. REV. 83, 96 (2007).
156. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rozensweig, The Untenable Case for
Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1045 n.9 (1992) (compiling a list of Bankruptcy
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a court appoints a trustee in a Chapter 11 case, the trustee is
usually appointed not to manage the business but to sell the
business.157 Some courts have more specifically tailored the
trustee remedy to the corporate governance problems of the
debtor corporation by appointing a trustee to work with, rather
than replace, corporate management when the skills of the
corporate managers are necessary to the continued viability of
the enterprise, despite the wrongdoing that led to the trustee
appointment.158
This balance that leaves governance powers in the
management of the debtor entity in most cases furthers the goals
that Congress had in mind when it enacted Chapter 11. A policy
of encouraging financially stressed entities to submit to a
bankruptcy proceeding while their operations could be salvaged
drove the enactment of Chapter 11 in 1978.159 Chapter 11
changed prior corporate bankruptcy practice. Under the
Bankruptcy Act, Chapter X, the reorganization chapter for large
public companies, required that the court appoint a trustee.160
Congress favored control by corporate management, and made a
choice, in enacting Chapter 11, to leave corporate control in
management hands.161 Congress made this decision to leave
control in management hands to further the rehabilitative policy
Code provisions that allow for continued debtor management); Warren, supra
note 146, at 372 (compiling a similar list).
157. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to
Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 72 (1992) (explaining that corporate
management remains in control in a Chapter 11 so that the corporation can
continue to operate and that a trustee will not be appointed to operate a
business with which she is not familiar).
158. See Alces, supra note 155, at 106–07 (giving examples of cases in which
the courts appointed a trustee to supervise the financial management of the
debtors but allowed existing managers to stay in their positions because of their
business development or creative talents).
159. See Warren, supra note 146, at 371–72 (explaining that both debtors
and creditors believed that the reorganization provisions under the 1898 Act
were ineffective, debtors because they did not trust that they could save their
businesses in bankruptcy and creditors because they believed that “the system
dissipated assets and delayed payouts unnecessarily”).
160. See Alces, supra note 155, at 91–92 (explaining bankruptcy governance
under the Bankruptcy Act).
161. John Wm. Butler, Jr., Chris L. Dickerson, & Stephen S. Neuman,
Preserving State Corporate Governance Law in Chapter 11: Maximizing Value
Through Traditional Fiduciaries, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 337, 337 (2010).
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behind Chapter 11. If the management remained in control,
stockholders, creditors, and the community would fare better
than they would if the business were liquidated.162
Even if bankruptcy serves to reorganize a large corporate
debtor efficiently, many bemoan the lack of governance controls
over small business entities. Small businesses make up the bulk,
in number, of Chapter 11 filings, yet many believe that
Chapter 11 is not effective with respect to small businesses.163
This criticism illustrates that the Chapter 11 governance
paradigm is one specifically tailored to one type of business: the
large business. It does not mean, however, that a rehabilitation
bankruptcy chapter cannot work for other entities. Other types of
entities may be successfully rehabilitated using the bankruptcy
process if the rehabilitation process includes governance
provisions appropriate to the debtor.164
162. See Brian A. Blum, The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small
Business in Bankruptcy, 4 J. SM. & EMERGING BUS. L. 181, 226 (2000) (arguing
that the Chapter 11 structure is ultimately designed to benefit the “community
as a whole”). The shift in practice from a mandatory trustee to presumed debtor
control has led to decades of debate about whether Chapter 11 gives creditors
too little control over the reorganization process. See, e.g., Bradley &
Rozensweig, supra note 156, at 1088–89 (1992) (concluding that corporate
managers use Chapter 11 as a shield from unwelcome management interference
by creditors); Frost, supra note 131, at 155–56 (concluding that although
Chapter 11 provides an oversight structure that could remedy an insolvent
corporation’s governance problems, the reality tells a different story); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (pt. 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 271–73 (1983) (concluding,
based on an empirical study of bankruptcy filings in the Western District of
Missouri, that the Code’s mechanisms designed to improve or replace poor
debtor management did not work as intended); Tabb, The Future, supra note
150, at 792–802 (surveying the criticisms of Chapter 11 and the suggestions for
improvement).
163. See Blum, supra note 162, at 196–201 (arguing that the typical
characteristics of failed small businesses impede quick and successful
reorganization under Chapter 11); Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren, The
Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 743, 788 (2005)
(explaining the mismatch between existing bankruptcy laws and the needs of
the entrepreneur with a failing business); Hon. A. Thomas Small, If You Fix It,
They Will Come: A New Playing Field for Small Business Bankruptcies, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 981, 981 (2005) (“Chapter 11 contains too many obstacles, and the
reorganization of small businesses under Chapter 11 is simply too difficult for
many businesses.”).
164. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, 78 MO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (suggesting a modified view of Chapter 11 to account for the
unique governance characteristics of religious institutions); Margaret E.
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C. Bankruptcy Governance over Municipalities
Viewed in the context of bankruptcy goals and governance,
the absence of many debtor controls from Chapter 9 makes sense.
A perceived problem with Chapter 9’s control allocation is that it
removes creditor control without providing a substitute restraint
on the debtor.165 That restraint cannot be imposed by the
bankruptcy court, both because of constitutional considerations
and because of the clear statement in Chapter 9 that the
bankruptcy court may not interfere with the debtor
municipality’s “political or governmental powers,” its “property or
revenues,” or its “use or enjoyment of [its] income-producing
property.”166
Creditors of a municipality are likewise unable to impose
debtor restraints in bankruptcy. One cannot talk about the value
of a municipality to creditors in the same way as one discusses
the value of an entity to creditors.167 Creditors can force an entity
to liquidate, either piecemeal as a result of state law creditor
remedies that allow creditors to seize private assets, or through
the bankruptcy process.168 There is no comparable liquidation
scheme for municipalities.169 Most municipal assets are immune
Juliano, Comment, Stalemate: The Need for Limitations on Regulatory Deference
in Electric Bankruptcies, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. 245, 248–50 (2003) (arguing that the
rehabilitative goals of the bankruptcy code are both appropriate and necessary
in the electric utility context, provided that additional governance provisions are
added to procedurally and substantively constrain electric utility regulators).
165. See, e.g., Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 355–59 (summarizing the
gaps between creditor controls in Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 and noting that
Chapter 9 provides municipalities with “relatively easy debt relief” because a
“municipality has greater powers than a regular corporate debtor does”).
166. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (implying that
powers to interfere with municipal political affairs are reserved to the states
because the Constitution does not delegate such powers to the federal
government).
167. See Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 370–72 (explaining that creditors
who would otherwise pursue common pool debtor assets in corporate bankruptcy
are barred from doing so in municipal bankruptcy because of state law and
sovereignty issues).
168. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (explaining how and why
the Bankruptcy Code endorses liquidation in the Chapter 11 context).
169. See In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1991) (“A municipal unit cannot liquidate its assets to satisfy its creditors
totally and finally.” (citation omitted)).
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from creditor process outside of bankruptcy;170 therefore, giving
creditors the power to force such sales inside of bankruptcy would
be counter to the general bankruptcy policy that respects state
law property rights “unless some federal interest requires a
different result.”171 The value of a municipality to its creditors is
its ability to repay those creditors.
Because municipalities are political instrumentalities,
elected officials manage their functions, and therefore creditors
have no ability to replace management, either inside or outside of
bankruptcy. A municipality is not a profit-making enterprise that
can be dismantled and distributed if it ceases to be successful;
rather, it exists to provide “essential governmental services.”172 It
does not have shareholders who, as residual owners, bear the risk
of its failure. Instead, a municipality has citizens who depend on
its services. As a result, the Code provisions that provide debtor
governance over a dysfunctional corporate entity would be
inappropriate in a municipal context. Allowing a bankruptcy
court to replace municipal management with a trustee would not
only give creditors and other parties in interest far more rights in
bankruptcy than they would have outside of bankruptcy but
would fall afoul of the Tenth Amendment.173
In some respects, municipal bankruptcy shares goals with
business bankruptcy, and where the two types of bankruptcy
share goals, they also share governance provisions. Bankruptcy
law gives corporate managers the breathing room they need to
make organizational decisions174 and some of the tools necessary
to do so, such as the power to assume or reject executory
contracts.175 A municipal debtor likewise receives these
bankruptcy benefits.176 Bankruptcy also allows both categories of
170. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 429–34 (explaining that
municipal assets are immune from creditor process).
171. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
172. Dubrow, supra note 3, at 546.
173. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving for the states all powers not
delegated to Congress by the Constitution).
174. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (providing an automatic stay of actions to
collect debts from the debtor and the debtor’s property).
175. See id. § 365 (allowing the manager of the bankrupt entity to “assume
or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor”).
176. See id. § 901 (incorporating 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 365).
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debtors to impose a plan of debt restructuring on nonconsenting
creditors.177 As a result, Chapter 9 borrows plan confirmation
provisions from Chapter 11.178
Because corporate reorganization implies a transfer of assets
to the persons best able to maximize their value, the goal of
corporate reorganization does not seem to apply well to municipal
bankruptcy. Chapter 9, without state intervention in the debtor
municipality’s affairs, can provide only debt relief and a fresh
start. Bankruptcy law therefore governs municipal debtors in a
manner that is closer to individual governance than entity
governance and leaves rehabilitative governance to state law.
Just as the Code manages an individual debtor’s behavior
through its entry and discharge rules, it governs municipal
debtors primarily through its entry rules.179 If the state wants to
participate in the Chapter 9 case, it can do so by conditioning its
Chapter 9 authorization on the debtor’s participation in a state
oversight program.180 If the state does not want to do so, the court
can ensure that only worthy municipalities—those that are
insolvent and that have negotiated in good faith with their
creditors—can file.181
The proponents of the original municipal bankruptcy
legislation had no intention of creating a governance vacuum.
Instead, they recognized that a federal procedure was necessary
only to provide the relief that a state alone could not provide to a
municipal debtor.182 They did not ignore organizational
governance over the debtor; rather, they designed the federal
177. See id. § 1129(b)(1) (providing for cramdown plans); id. § 901
(incorporating § 1129(b)(1)).
178. As I explain below, however, it remains unclear how these provisions
will work in a Chapter 9. Infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
179. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (establishing criteria for qualification as a
debtor under Chapter 9).
180. See id. § 109(c)(2) (noting that a municipal debtor qualifies for Chapter
9 only if it is “specifically authorized” as a municipality, or it qualifies under
state law).
181. See id. § 109(c)(5) (requiring that municipalities seeking to file under
Chapter 9 engage, when possible, in good faith negotiations with creditors or
make agreements on amounts owed).
182. See A.M. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS: A CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE
351–52 (1936) (noting that state law alone was “inadequate” because the states
could not compel creditors to accept agreements).
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bankruptcy law to provide the federal benefits of debt relief as a
complement to state-led efforts to rehabilitate municipalities.183
In the next section, I will explain that history to show how
Congress intended that municipal financial relief be provided by
a system integrating state governance over municipalities with
federal debt relief.
IV. A History of Chapter 9 from a Governance Perspective
A. Why Municipal Bankruptcy?
In 1934, Congress enacted the predecessor statute to today’s
Chapter 9 in emergency legislation passed as the United States
was recovering from the Great Depression.184 Thousands of
municipalities defaulted on their debt obligations during the
Depression,185 and in 1933, about seven percent of the municipal
debt outstanding was in default.186 Although municipalities
started to issue bonds in the early 1800s,187 in the years

183. See id. at 351–53 (discussing the complementarity between state and
federal legislation).
184. In 1934, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to include
Chapter IX, titled Provisions for the Emergency Temporary Aid of Insolvent
Public Debtors and to Preserve the Assets Thereof and for Other Related
Purposes. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 73-251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2012)),
invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298
U.S. 513 (1936). In Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District, the
Supreme Court ruled the original Municipal Bankruptcy Act to be
unconstitutional and Congress replaced it in 1937. Ashton, 298 U.S. at 531–32.
The Court upheld the 1937 Act in United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51–52
(1938). Congress made municipal bankruptcy law a permanent part of
bankruptcy law in 1946. See Kenneth N. Klee, Introduction, 32 CAL. BANKR. J.
221, 221 (2012) (explaining the early federal legislation).
185. See Philo, supra note 129, at 80 (explaining that 4,770 cities defaulted
on their debt during the Great Depression).
186. See Harold Gill Reuschlein, Municipal Debt Readjustment: Present
Relief and Future Policy, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 365 (1938) (reporting that “out of
$14,000,000,000 invested in securities of local state governmental units,
$1,000,000,000 were reported to be in default”).
187. See HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 30 (stating that although the exact
date of the first municipal bond is unknown, New York City began to issue
bonds in about 1812).
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preceding the Depression, municipal securities were more widely
distributed among investors than they had ever been.188
The distribution of municipal securities among a wide range
of investors increased the need for federal involvement in the
resolution of municipal financial distress for two reasons. First,
because many types of investors held such securities, the effect of
a municipal default would be felt throughout the nation’s
economy.189 Second, creditors began to appreciate the benefits of a
collective proceeding to collect municipal debts over the
uncontrolled use of lawsuits by creditors seeking to be the first to
collect their claims.190
Municipal finance experts in the 1930s recognized that
traditional creditor remedies were ineffective to deal with the
problem of municipal defaults. The nature of a municipality as a
public service provider has several debt collection ramifications.
The first is that a municipality cannot be liquidated in the
traditional sense. A state might have a mechanism by which to
dissolve and consolidate municipalities, but that is not a remedy
that creditors can pursue.191 While creditors of private entities
can seize and sell the assets of the defaulting entity to satisfy
their claims through processes such as levy and execution,192
creditors of a municipality are barred from seizing municipal
assets because municipalities are deemed to hold their assets
devoted to public use in trust for their citizens.193 Because a
188. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 365 n.5 (setting forth the
distribution of municipal and state bonds among individuals, banks, insurance
companies and other entities in December 1932).
189. See id. at 365 (noting that “the spread of holdings of municipal
securities” results in widespread effects of economic collapse).
190. See Edward J. Dimock, Legal Problems of Financially Embarrassed
Municipalities, 22 VA. L. REV. 39, 40–41 (1935) [hereinafter Dimock, Legal
Problems] (comparing the creditors of private corporations to those of
municipalities and explaining that the need of corporate creditors for a collective
proceeding led to the development of the equity receivership).
191. See id. at 1376 (noting that municipalities can be dissolved by the state,
local initiative, consent, or inactivity).
192. See 1 HON. WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS § 6:53 (Nov. 2012) (discussing the postjudgment use of the writ of
execution).
193. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 367 (discussing the inability of
creditors to obtain properties used for “public purpose”); see also Jeff B.
Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obligations of Public
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municipality’s assets are often immune from creditor process,
they are worthless to the creditors of the municipality.194 A
municipality’s taxing power is valuable to creditors, but creditors
cannot assume control over that power.195
In the 1930s, as now, the only viable collection remedy
against a municipality was the mandamus action. Creditors
brought mandamus actions against municipalities to force the
responsible municipal officers to either pay the creditor’s claim
out of tax collections or to levy a sufficient tax to pay the
creditor’s judgment.196 These actions had the potential to place
the municipality’s essential services in peril.197 Although the
mandamus remedy was available to creditors, it was effective
mainly as a threat device; sometimes the officers subject to the
mandamus action would leave the jurisdiction in order to avoid
the writ or allow themselves to be jailed for contempt of court.198
The benefit of mandamus was therefore primarily in its value as
a catalyst to negotiation and settlement among the municipality
and its creditors.199 Even that benefit was limited; a court would
Corporations, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 28, 28–30 (1933) (discussing statutes and case
law that protected municipal assets from seizure by creditors).
194. See City of Chicago v. Hasley, 25 Ill. 495, 595 (1861) (explaining that
the seizure of city assets could cause great harm to a city’s residents); Buell v.
Arnold, 102 N.W. 338, 339 (Wisc. 1905) (explaining that the property of
municipal corporations cannot be seized or sold upon execution); McConnell &
Picker, supra note 3, at 429–34 (explaining laws prohibiting the seizure of
municipal assets).
195. See Dimock, Legal Problems, supra note 190, at 40 (recognizing that
“we are unwilling in this country to permit the creditors to determine what shall
be spent for those municipal services and what shall be applied upon their
debts”).
196. See Fordham, supra note 193, at 39–47 (explaining the different types
of mandamus actions).
197. See Dimock, Legal Problems, supra note 190, at 40–41 (discussing the
high costs of litigation in mandamus actions and the resulting interference with
competent municipal governance).
198. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 511
(1942) (discussing the lengths to which municipal officers would go to avoid
mandamus); Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 367 n.19 (“One Kansas county chose
its officials upon condition that they should remain in hiding and appear in the
jurisdiction to transact the county’s business only by night.”).
199. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 368 (discussing the ineffectiveness of
the mandamus remedy and the various types of negotiated agreements between
municipalities and creditors).
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refuse to issue an order of mandamus if the failure to pay debts
was due to the inability to do so rather than the unwillingness to
do so, or if the municipality had already reached its constitutional
or statutory tax limits.200
In the 1930s, lawyers recognized that they could look to the
states, the federal government, or both for a solution to the
problem of widespread municipal defaults. Both sovereigns were
limited in their ability to solve the problem. A state could actively
supervise the finances of its municipalities either by imposing a
receivership201 or by establishing a municipal finance
commission. 202 A receiver or commission could actively manage a
city’s budget and supervise its borrowing.203 As one commentator
at the time explained, the state could provide “the very kind of
active, aggressive leadership in rehabilitating the finances of an
insolvent [municipality] that is needed.”204
Although the states could impose fiscal discipline on their
municipalities, their ability to impose a plan of composition on
dissenting creditors was constitutionally suspect for two reasons.
The first was the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, which
prohibits states from “passing any Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts.”205 The Contracts Clause therefore prohibits the
states from passing laws that would force a creditor to accept less
than what it is owed on a claim without that creditor’s consent.
Although the Contracts Clause does not prohibit a state from
passing a law prospectively impairing contracts because all
contracts executed after the enactment of such a law would
200. See Comment, Administration of Municipal Credit, 43 YALE L.J. 924,
963–64 (1934) (noting that courts cannot enforce a municipality to gather more
revenue to pay creditors); Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 368 (discussing the
extreme difficulties creditors faced when trying to collect payment from debtor
municipalities).
201. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 352 (explaining the benefits and
limitations of a receivership).
202. See Edward J. Dimock, Progress in Solving Municipal Insolvency
Problems, 27 VA. L. REV. 193, 194–96 (1940) [hereinafter Dimock, Progress]
(discussing the New Jersey Municipal Finance Commission); Reuschlein, supra
note 186, at 368 (discussing the general powers of such commissions).
203. See HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 353 (discussing the broad reach of
state receivership programs).
204. Id.
205. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 3,
at 427–29 (explaining the history of the Chapter 9).
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incorporate such an impairment,206 municipalities were in crisis
in the 1930s and needed a mechanism to adjust their existing
debts, not the obligations that they would incur in the future.207
Even a state proceeding that would operate only
prospectively was suspect. A state proceeding could relieve a
debtor municipality from its obligations only if it could bind all of
the municipality’s creditors, wherever located. Yet a long line of
cases beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ogden v.
Saunders208 had held that a discharge from debt granted
pursuant to one state’s laws could not be enforced against a
creditor from another state who did not participate in the
discharge proceeding.209 As a result, a collective proceeding under
state law would be effective to bind only those out-of-state
creditors who voluntarily participated in the proceeding.
A federal collective proceeding to resolve municipal financial
distress was not free from constitutional objections, however.
Under the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress has the power to pass
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States.”210 Commentators expressed some skepticism as to
whether a federal process to adjust the debts of a municipality
was within the purview of the Bankruptcy Clause, positing that
the “subject of bankruptcies” was limited to “proceedings
contemplating surrender of the debtor’s assets for distribution to
his creditors and discharge of the debtor.”211 Because a
municipality’s assets cannot be forcibly distributed to its
creditors, it was possible that a municipal debt adjustment
206. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 480 (discussing constitutional
limits on state insolvency legislation).
207. See Administration of Municipal Credit, supra note 200, at 969–70
(discussing the emergence of the Sumners Bill and the national economic
emergency).
208. 25 U.S. 213 (1827).
209. See, e.g., Cook v. Moffat & Curtis, 46 U.S. 295, 309 (1847) (finding that
a state cannot pass a law affecting contracts beyond its territory); Hawley v.
Hunt, 27 Iowa 303, 314 (1869) (concluding that “if the creditor is a non-resident
of the State, a discharge under a State law cannot affect him unless he
voluntarily becomes a party to the proceeding”); Hornick, More & Porterfield v.
Farmers’ & Merchs.’ Bank, 227 N.W. 375, 379 (S.D. 1929) (stressing that Ogden
limits “the power of states to act adversely upon the rights of citizens of other
states”).
210. U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8, cl.4.
211. Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 371 n.35.
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statute was not within the subject of bankruptcies.212 This view of
the Bankruptcy Clause was not limited to its extension to
municipal
insolvency;
Congress
also
added
railroad
reorganizations and corporate reorganizations to the bankruptcy
laws in the 1930s213 and its power to do so was similarly
questioned.214 One objection to the extension of the federal
bankruptcy to corporate and railroad reorganizations was that
the power to legislate on the subject of bankruptcies did not
include the power to adjust the obligations of entities that were
merely insolvent in the sense that they could not meet their
obligations but did not meet the common law definition of
bankrupt.215
Given the expansion of the term “bankruptcy” from its
original eighteenth century meaning, the Bankruptcy Clause
objection to a federal law to resolve municipal financial distress
was fairly weak. A much more serious objection to extending
Congress’ bankruptcy power to municipalities was rooted in the
Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution
reserves to the states all powers not granted to the federal
government nor prohibited to the states by the Constitution.216
When a private entity files for bankruptcy, all of its property
becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, over which the court has
some control.217 Because a federal proceeding could intrude on a
212. See Asa G. Briggs, Shall Bankruptcy Jurisdiction be Extended to
Include Municipalities and Other Taxable Subdivisions?, 19 A.B.A. J. 637, 637–
38 (1933) (“No one ever intended to give to Congress power to extend the
bankruptcy law to municipalities . . . .”). For a contrary view at the time, see
Dimock, Legal Problems supra note 190, at 53 (“Congress in the exercise of its
bankruptcy power is not confined to giving to the federal courts the power to
make adjudications and to grant discharges.”).
213. See Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, What is Right About Bankruptcy Law and
Wrong About Its Critics, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 837–38 (1994) (discussing the
1933 and 1934 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
214. See James R. Morford, Federal Legislation for Corporate
Reorganizations: A Negative View, 19 A.B.A. J. 702, 704 (1933) (discussing the
constitutionality of the expansion of the federal bankruptcy laws to railroad
corporations).
215. Albert K. Stebbins, Constitutionality of the Recent Amendment to the
Bankruptcy Law, 17 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 171–73 (1933); Morford, supra note 214,
at 704.
216. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
217. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012) (limiting the power of the debtor to use
property of the estate without the court’s approval); id. § 541 (providing that
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state’s power to govern its cities, some feared that a bankruptcy
chapter for municipalities would violate the Tenth
Amendment.218
The constitutional restrictions on both the state and federal
powers to resolve a municipal debt crisis that had the potential to
contaminate the national economy led to calls for a combination
of state and federal action. States could provide active fiscal
oversight, but could not impose binding debt adjustments on
nonconsenting creditors. Federal legislation could force debt
reductions on creditors but could not provide the active fiscal
guidance that was needed to ensure that a municipality could
both resolve its current problems and avoid future problems.219 In
the 1930s, therefore, experts in municipal finance recognized a
need for a combination of federal and state action to resolve a
municipal debt crisis that had the potential to contaminate the
economy of the entire country.220 Those experts recognized that
cooperative action could overcome the legal limitations placed on
each sovereign.221 As a result, they designed the original
bankruptcy legislation to be just one component of their desired
mechanism for resolving the financial crisis then facing American
municipalities.
B. The 1930s Wish List and Resulting Statutes
Chapter IX, the original municipal bankruptcy statute,
allowed any municipality or any other political subdivision of a

upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, an estate is created consisting of all
interests of the debtor in property at the time the petition is filed).
218. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 427 (discussing the role of
federalism in the development of bankruptcy laws).
219. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 385 (recognizing municipal debt
crisis would not be resolved if debt readjustment was not accompanied by state
plans controlling local credit).
220. See HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 353 (noting that “there is a definite
need for concurrent action by both the federal and state governments”).
221. See, e.g., id. (urging complementary measures because each sovereign
could “supply the major limitation in the other”); Administration of Municipal
Credit, supra note 200, at 1005 (recognizing that federal legislation and “careful
state supervision of local credit are both essential to proper solution of the vital
and complex problem presented by . . . municipal insolvencies”).
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state to file a voluntary petition for readjustment of its debts.222
Congress had a modest goal, that of solving the holdout problem,
in passing the legislation.223 The Act required the debtor
municipality to prepare and acquire consent from a prescribed
number of creditors to the plan of adjustment before filing for
bankruptcy.224 Although the Act contained no automatic stay of
litigation against the municipality,225 the court could order a stay
of actions both against the municipality and against its officers
who might be the targets of a mandamus action.226 The court
could approve a plan upon the vote of the necessary number of
creditors, so long as the plan was “fair, equitable, and for the best
interests of creditors.”227 A confirmed plan would bind all
creditors, including those who did not accept the plan.228 The law
explicitly rejected any limits on the power of states to control
their municipalities and also allowed the states to decide whether
their municipalities could take advantage of its provisions.229
Two years later, the Supreme Court struck down the 1934
Act as unconstitutional. In Ashton v. Cameron County Water

222. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 80(a), 48 Stat. 798 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303), invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
223. See Wylie Kilpatrick, Federal Regulation of Local Debt, 26 NAT’L MUN.
REV. 283, 288 (1937) (arguing that the municipal bankruptcy act was not a wellbalanced approach to the municipal debt problem precisely because of its modest
goal in binding dissenting creditors to a plan of adjustment).
224. See Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 80(a), 48 Stat. 798
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303), invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty.
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (requiring, as a
prerequisite to filing, the acceptance of the plan by the holders of at least 30% of
the debt of drainage, irrigation, reclamation and levee districts and 51% of the
debt of all other taxing authorities).
225. At the time, no bankruptcy petition under any chapter of the 1898 Act
imposed an automatic stay of all actions against the debtor and the debtor’s
property. The first automatic stay was included in farm-debtor relief legislation
in 1933. See Frank R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 175, 179 (1978) (explaining the history of the automatic stay).
226. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 80(c)(9), 48 Stat. 798
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303), invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty.
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
227. Id. § 80 (d), (e).
228. Id. § 80(f).
229. Id. § 80(k).
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Improvement District,230 the Court found the original municipal
bankruptcy legislation to be “inconsistent with the idea of
sovereignty.”231 The fact that states retained the power to prevent
their municipalities from filing for bankruptcy did not remedy the
Act’s constitutional infirmities, for the Court stressed that
“neither consent nor submission by the States can enlarge the
power of Congress.”232 In the Court’s view, allowing the federal
courts to interfere with the obligations of states and their
political subdivisions was impermissible, even with state
consent.233
During the short life of Chapter IX, 88 municipalities filed for
bankruptcy, 24 of which were cities, towns, or counties.234 One
writer on municipal finance, A.M. Hillhouse, observed that the
mere existence of the legislation alleviated the problem of holdout
creditors because the knowledge that a municipality might resort
to a bankruptcy filing to force a plan on such creditors was
enough to bring recalcitrant creditors to the bargaining table.235
The utility of the Act as a vehicle for cooperation between a state
and the federal court went untested, however. One of the many
petitions pending at the time of the Ashton opinion was that of
North Bergen, New Jersey.236 By the time North Bergen filed for
bankruptcy in 1936, the New Jersey Municipal Finance
Commission had assumed control over the township’s fiscal
affairs.237 Most commentators at the time called for
complementary state and federal legislation to address municipal
financial distress; to them, North Bergen could have been an
ideal case.238 Had the case been allowed to proceed, it might have
provided some guidance on questions regarding the relationship
between the federal court and the state oversight commission as

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

298 U.S. 513 (1936).
Id. at 531.
Id.
See id. (noting that state sovereignty “cannot be surrendered”).
HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 387–88.
Id. at 388–89.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id.

GOALS AND GOVERNANCE

449

well as the nature of the commission’s control both during and
after the case.239
Both before Congress passed the first municipal
bankruptcy act and after the Court held it to be
unconstitutional, commentators suggested components of an
ideal system to resolve the municipal debt crisis. An early
commentator on municipal insolvency, Edward J. Dimock,240
set forth the essential elements of any comprehensive scheme
to alleviate municipal financial distress.241 He analogized his
ideal municipal debt resolution process to the equity
receivership that had been developed in the late nineteenth
century to restructure financially troubled railroads during a
period in which there was no uniform federal bankruptcy
statute.242 Dimock’s list of elements included: outside control of
the insolvent debtor’s finances,243 concerted action by all
creditors, accompanied by a stay of litigation to secure a
“period of peace” to develop and evaluate a plan of debt
adjustment,244 and a settlement binding on all creditors.245
Dimock and others recognized that both state and federal
action were needed for a well-balanced approach to the
municipal debt problem. Some federal action was clearly
necessary, whether it be by granting full faith and credit to
state debt adjustment proceedings or by extending Congress’s
bankruptcy power to municipalities.246 The federal power was
239. Id.
240. Edward Dimock was a leading bond lawyer and bar leader who later
became a judge on the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. Edward J. Dimock Appointed to Federal Bench, 37 A.B.A. J. 674, 674
(1951).
241. See Dimock, Legal Problems, supra note 190, at 43–44 (noting that the
three elements of equity receivership are also necessary to deal with private and
municipal insolvencies).
242. See id. at 43 (suggesting that the equity receivership system serve as a
model to modify the municipal insolvency laws); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S
DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 56–60 (2001) (explaining
the history of the equity receivership); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 21–22
(2005) (explaining why equity receiverships developed).
243. Dimock, Legal Problems, supra note 190, at 44.
244. Id. at 46–47.
245. Id. at 50.
246. See id. at 51–52 (discussing suggested ways to invoke federal
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necessary for one reason—to overcome the “obdurate minority”
of dissenting creditors.247
The early commentary makes clear, however, that
although a municipal bankruptcy chapter may have been a
necessary tool to resolve the national municipal debt crisis, it
was an implement with a very limited use.248 The writers in the
1930s called for robust state intervention in municipal fiscal
affairs. They recognized that the binding debt adjustment
facilitated by a bankruptcy chapter would be useless without
some plan to control local finances.249 Only a state could
provide the necessary administrative supervision over its
localities in order to enable the municipalities to maximize
revenues and borrow money at reasonable rates.250 Although
commentators recognized that some might object to oversight
of a municipality by state officials unfamiliar with local
conditions, they also recognized the possibility that the
problems of one municipality could have a negative impact on

bankruptcy power in regulating municipal debt).
247. E.H. Foley, Jr., Recent Developments in Federal-Municipal
Relationships, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 511 n.156 (1938); see also Reuschlein, supra
note 186, at 368 (noting that a state could not enforce a debt adjustment plan
against dissenting creditors because of the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution).
248. See HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 353 (noting that state control of
municipal defeat is broad but with one fatal flaw: that it cannot compel
agreement by creditors, therefore necessitating federal legislation to fill that
gap).
249. See Dimock, Progress, supra note 202, at 204–05 (writing that, in order
for bankruptcy to provide the same benefits for municipalities that it does for
private entities, the state power to control municipalities must supplement the
federal bankruptcy process); Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 385 (warning that
debt adjustment without a state plan to control local credit might lead to “more
serious predicaments” than doing nothing).
250. See HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 353 (explaining that the state can
“collect taxes, revise the local budget and approve or disapprove all new
borrowing”); Kilpatrick, supra note 223, at 287 (observing that even if federal
courts were constitutionally permitted to exercise fiscal oversight, they are
poorly equipped to do so); Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 386 (noting that a
readjustment plan cannot establish permanent mechanisms for the supervision
of fiscal management).
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the credit of other municipalities in the same state.251 Only
state oversight could mitigate this possibility of contagion.252
Several commentators called for formal cooperation between
the states and the federal courts in municipal bankruptcy
proceedings. Some suggested that the debt adjustment apparatus
provided by federal law be available only to municipalities in
states in which the state government exercised positive oversight
with respect to local defaults.253 Others promoted a mechanism
through which the state would be involved both before
bankruptcy in formulating the plan of adjustment and after
bankruptcy in supervising the municipality until its finances
sufficiently improved.254 Experts considered state oversight such
an essential complement to federal legislation that some
suggested that the state be given the power to file the bankruptcy
petition for its municipality.255
Although experts expressed an appetite for a formal role for
states in the federal municipal bankruptcy framework,
Congress’s second attempt at municipal bankruptcy legislation,
passed in 1937,256 was very similar to its first. Despite the
similarities between the two acts, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Bekins upheld the second.257 In upholding the 1937 Act,
known as Chapter X, the Court stressed that in order for a court
to approve a debt readjustment plan, the debtor municipality
251. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 386–87 (discussing the effects of
“purely local” conditions).
252. See id. (finding that the levels of administrative organization can
adequately account for local conditions).
253. See Kilpatrick, supra note 223, at 289 (suggesting that the federal
process be made available only in states “taking positive action to control and
cure local defaults”); Administration of Municipal Credit, supra note 200, at
969–70 (proposing state administrative oversight of local credit as a prerequisite
to federal relief).
254. See HILLHOUSE, supra note182, at 354–55 (discussing the utility of a
state administrative body).
255. See id. at 355 (suggesting that the state and municipality together
petition the court for relief); Administration of Municipal Credit, supra note
200, at 996–99 (proposing that a permanent state agency should be given
supervisory authority over municipalities).
256. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 653 (codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (2012)).
257. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51–52 (1938) (upholding the
Act of Aug. 16, 1937).
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must have been authorized by state law to take all action
necessary to implement the plan.258 Moreover, the Court
recognized that the statute, by deferring to the states’ control
over their fiscal affairs, was narrowly drawn so as not to interfere
with state sovereignty.259 Therefore, federal bankruptcy law did
not unconstitutionally constrain the states’ powers to govern
their municipalities. The Court emphasized the policy of
cooperation implied by the bankruptcy law, explaining that the
state “invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its
agency which the State itself is powerless to rescue,” adding that
through the state’s “cooperation with the national government
the needed relief is given.”260 Mindful of the municipal debt crisis
facing the nation, the Court refused to hold that the Constitution
had rendered both the states and the federal government helpless
to alleviate the problem.261
The foregoing discussion illustrates that the early municipal
bankruptcy commentary called for cooperation between states
and the federal government in dealing with municipal financial
failure. Congress fashioned the predecessor to Chapter 9 within
this framework in order to solve the one problem that states
alone could not: the holdout problem.262 No one intended for
federal legislation to operate alone to solve the municipal debt
problem; as Edward Dimock noted in his 1940 article assessing
the progress made in addressing the municipal debt crisis, there
was “plenty left to be done . . . when trouble comes again.”263
Trouble came again in the 1970s when New York City fell into
financial disrepair, presenting a municipal default scenario

258. Id. at 49.
259. Id. at 51.
260. Id. at 54.
261. Id.
262. See Fred E. Neef, Consent of State as Affecting Jurisdiction in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 15 DICTA 301, 302 (1938) (observing that as a result of
the early municipal bankruptcy legislation the “defeat of a fair composition
agreement by a selfish minority cannot be accomplished”); Administration of
Municipal Credit, supra note 200, at 974 (“[S]ome method of enforcing
readjustments of municipal debt structures against minority creditors seems
essential, and . . . utilization of the federal bankruptcy power appears to be the
most feasible device for accomplishing such enforcement . . . .”).
263. Dimock, Progress, supra note 202, at 204.
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potentially as serious as the one the United States faced in the
aftermath of the Depression.264
C. Congress Revisits Municipal Financial Distress in 1976
Three decades passed without any attention to municipal
bankruptcy. Very few municipalities filed for bankruptcy during
that period, and the municipalities that filed were specialpurpose
districts
rather
than
large
general-purpose
municipalities.265 The financial crisis facing New York City in the
mid-1970s, however, caused policymakers to take a fresh look at
the federal municipal bankruptcy legislation.266 When its crisis
hit in 1975, closing the municipal bond markets,267 experts
considered bankruptcy an unsuitable option for a city of New
York’s size.268 Indeed, several elements of the federal municipal
bankruptcy statute, then known as Chapter IX, made its use by a
large city impractical.269
The main concern about Chapter IX was that its entry
requirements made its use by cities such as New York unfeasible.
The law required a municipality to submit, with its bankruptcy
petition, its plan of debt adjustment, agreed to by a majority in
dollar amount of its creditors.270 Many saw this requirement as
an impediment to speedy relief for a municipality because by the
264. See Joseph Patchan & Susan B. Collins, The 1976 Municipal
Bankruptcy Law, 31 MIAMI L. REV. 287, 289 (1977) (discussing the severity of the
new financial crisis).
265. See id. at 289 n.13 (stating that only sixty-four municipalities filed for
bankruptcy between 1946 and 1976); Winograd, supra note 29, at 273 (stating
that public sector bankruptcies between the 1940s and 1970s typically involved
small entities formed to perform specific functions).
266. Patchan & Collins, supra note 264, at 291.
267. See generally Donna E. Shalala & Carol Bellamy, A State Saves a City:
The New York Case, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1119 (1976).
268. Patchan & Collins, supra note 264, at 291.
269. See, e.g., King, supra note 23, at 1158 (explaining that the then-existing
municipal bankruptcy legislation was not “realistically available to major public
entities”); Patchan & Collins, supra note 264, at 291–92 (explaining that
structural deficiencies in the municipal bankruptcy chapter, such as its lack of
an automatic stay and its requirement that the debtor municipality submit a
plan of adjustment with its petition, made its use by large cities impracticable).
270. King, supra note 23, at 1158; Patchan & Collins, supra note 264, at 290.
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1970s, many cities had a large number of bondholders, many of
whom held their bonds in bearer form and were therefore difficult
to identify.271
The 1976 Act simplified the entry requirement. Rather than
requiring a prepetition plan, the 1976 legislation made a plan one
of four alternative prerequisites to filing. If the debtor
municipality did not negotiate a plan with its creditors before
filing for bankruptcy, it could still file if it showed that it
negotiated in good faith with its creditors before filing or that
negotiating with its creditors was impracticable.272
Loosening the entry requirement addressed the major
concern about the utility of Chapter IX for a large city such as
New York.273 Congress went further, however, and incorporated
several features of private entity reorganization into the
municipal bankruptcy chapter. The 1976 amendments added an
automatic stay, which by then was a feature of other chapters of
the Bankruptcy Act and which allowed the municipal debtor to
avoid the extra time and expense of separately petitioning the
court to stay proceedings against it.274 Congress also added
avoiding powers to Chapter IX that mirrored the trustee’s power
in other bankruptcy chapters to avoid prepetition transfers of the
debtor’s property shown to be fraudulent, preferential, or
unperfected.275 The power to avoid preferential transfers proved
problematic with respect to municipal bonds when Cleveland fell
into financial distress in 1979, leading to further amendments to
municipal bankruptcy law in 1988 to inject some certainty into
the treatment of municipal bondholders in Chapter 9.276

271. See King, supra note 23, at 1158 (noting that many bonds were bearer
bonds with unidentified holders); Patchan & Collins, supra note 264, at 291
(discussing how the New York crisis highlighted the deficiencies of the Act).
272. See King, supra note 23, at 1161 (listing some of the new entry criteria).
There was also a fourth alternative: the debtor could file without negotiation if
it had a reasonable fear that a creditor would attempt to recover a preferential
transfer. Id.
273. See Patchan & Collins, supra note 264, at 294 (noting that the new
Chapter IX alleviated previous difficulties).
274. King, supra note 23, at 1165–66.
275. Id. at 1166–68.
276. See generally Robert S. Amdursky, The 1988 Municipal Bankruptcy
Amendments: History, Purposes, and Effects, 22 URB. LAW. 1 (1990).
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One rehabilitative provision added to Chapter IX in 1976 was
the power of the debtor to reject executory contracts. This power
was available to private debtors in other bankruptcy chapters277
but was potentially controversial when exercised by public
debtors. From its initial enactment, the federal municipal
bankruptcy chapter respected and yielded to each state’s right to
govern its cities,278 and the 1976 Act did not change this. Like its
predecessors, the 1976 municipal bankruptcy act provided that
nothing in the Act “shall be construed to limit or impair the
power of any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any
municipality or any political subdivision of or in such State in the
exercise of its political or governmental powers.”279 Because the
power to reject executory contracts encompassed the power to
reject labor contracts, which are often subject to state collective
bargaining laws, this new power created a potential federalism
problem.280
Although Kimhi suggested that the inclusion of the power to
reject executory contracts was evidence of Chapter 9’s broader
restructuring goal,281 there is another way to look at the 1976
additions to the municipal bankruptcy chapter. By the 1970s, the
277. Patchan & Collins, supra note 264, at 299.
278. Supra notes 257–61 and accompanying text.
279. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 83, 90 Stat. 315, 316–17
(1976) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012)) (providing for voluntary
reorganization procedures for the adjustment of the debts of municipalities).
280. See King, supra note 23, at 1169 (recognizing that the inclusion of the
power to reject executory contracts could be controversial in the municipal
bankruptcy context); Patchan & Collins, supra note 264, at 299–300 (explaining
a potential conflict between bankruptcy law and a state law prohibiting
rejection of pension agreements); Winograd, supra note 29, at 277–80
(discussing the congressional debates about the application of the debtor’s power
to reject executory contracts to labor contracts subject to state law restrictions).
281. See Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 367 (“The new chapter was no
longer confined to setting a majority voting rule for the approval of debt
readjustment plans, but rather adopted a comprehensive bankruptcy procedure
designed to help distressed localities, such as New York, survive and deal with
financial crises.”). Kimhi argues that the change of the bankruptcy procedures
themselves, including the power to reject executory contracts, is evidence of
Chapter 9’s broader restructuring goal. Id. at 368. The legislative history of the
1976 amendments can be read to support his contention because Congress
expressed the goal of providing a federal procedure by which a municipality
could “restructure its indebtedness in such fashion as to avoid continuing
insolvency.” Preamble to Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315, 315 (1976).
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municipal bankruptcy law drafted in the 1930s was unsuitable
for larger cities, largely because of its entry requirements. When
Congress liberalized the entry requirements, it also added some
elements of private bankruptcy law, such as the automatic stay
and the powers to avoid preferential and fraudulent transfers. All
of these powers relate to debt adjustment, not to reorganizational
governance. By giving a municipal debtor some additional
bankruptcy benefits, Congress provided the states with
additional tools for resolving the financial distress of their cities if
they chose to accept the assistance of federal law.282 Rather than
rejecting Congress’s original municipal bankruptcy goal of solving
the holdout problem, the 1976 amendments strengthened it.
New York did not resort to bankruptcy. Instead, the state
legislature established the Municipal Assistance Corporation
(MAC) and authorized the MAC to issue debt for the city and
draft a rescue program for the city.283 The city’s finances were
placed under the supervision of a control board that included city
and state officials, and the federal government deemed New
York’s problems to be significant enough nationally to enter into
a credit agreement with the city.284 New York’s recovery was
successful because the state acted quickly and drastically.285
The 1970s saw two parallel developments. In one, New York
State, with the financial help of the federal government,
orchestrated a recovery plan for New York City without resort to
the bankruptcy laws. In the other, Congress amended the
bankruptcy law to make its municipal bankruptcy chapter a
workable alternative for large general-purpose municipalities and
in the process, added some features of corporate bankruptcy. At
the same time, the municipal bankruptcy scholarship focused
primarily on what the federal bankruptcy law standing alone
could do for cities, and thus differed from the 1930s scholarship,
which promoted a federal municipal bankruptcy chapter as a
complement to state intervention.286 Although two commentators
282. See King, supra note 23, at 1165–71 (discussing stays, avoiding powers,
and rehabilitative provisions).
283. Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 267, at 1127–28.
284. Id. at 1129–31.
285. Id. at 1132.
286. See supra notes 249–55 and accompanying text (discussing the 1930s’
scholarship and the need for a combination of federal and state action to resolve
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pronounced the 1976 Act as deficient in that it did not provide a
mechanism to involve the state in the formulation of a city’s
bankruptcy plan,287 two writers involved in the rescue of New
York City attributed the city’s avoidance of bankruptcy in part to
“the strong belief that elected and not appointed officials ought to
put the city’s fiscal matters in order.”288 After the 1970s,
scholarship about municipal bankruptcy tended to present it as
an alternative to state intervention,289 and because of some of its
differences from Chapter 11, a poor alternative at that.
This turn in the scholarship is unfortunate, because it leaves
state policymakers with few recent resources as they decide
whether and how to allow their municipalities to file for
bankruptcy. Detroit’s filing is likely to lead other states with
struggling cities to reevaluate the conditions that they place on
Chapter 9 filings. It is important that states not lose sight of the
role of Chapter 9 in an integrated state–federal approach to
municipal financial distress. In the next section, I explain how
Congress has invited states to play a role in Chapter 9 debtor
governance and the extent to which states have chosen to do so.
V. Specific Authorization to File for Chapter 9: An Invitation to
Govern
The specific authorization requirement gives the states a
gatekeeper role by allowing the states to choose whether, and
under what conditions, their municipalities can file for
bankruptcy. Chapter 9 does not grant municipalities the power to
file for bankruptcy; rather, it presents to the states the choice of
giving their municipalities the power to seek bankruptcy
municipal debt crises).
287. See Patchan & Collins, supra note 264, at 305 (recognizing that a state
might play a crucial role in developing a bankruptcy plan for one of its
municipalities).
288. Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 267, at 1132.
289. See, e.g., Dubrow, supra note 3 (writing about Chapter 9 as one
alternative for resolving municipal financial distress, using the filing of
Bridgeport, Connecticut, as an example); supra notes 3, 16 and accompanying
text; cf. Tung, supra note 3, at 916 (suggesting that California require the
governor to approve all municipal bankruptcy petitions as a way of encouraging
cooperation between the state and the distressed municipality).
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protection.290 By granting the states this gatekeeper role,
Congress not only exercised care to ensure that the municipal
bankruptcy chapter passed constitutional muster, it also provided
a mechanism for state participation in the federal bankruptcy
process.
The authorization requirement is a governance control that
reflects the hybrid fresh start–rehabilitation goal of Chapter 9.
All Chapter 9 can do on its own is give debt relief.291 Combined
with state intervention, however, Chapter 9 can both give debt
relief and facilitate municipal rehabilitation. Although the
original intention of Congress was for Chapter 9 to support state
governance over the debtor, the invitation to states to exercise
that governance was not explicit until Congress amended
Chapter 9 in 1994 to condition entry on specific, rather than
general, authorization by the state.292 In this section, I explain
the evolution of the authorization requirement and the role that
it plays in inviting state governance over Chapter 9 debtors.
A. Reasons for and Evolution of the Authorization Requirement
A municipality may file for bankruptcy only if it is
“specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by
name, to be a debtor [under Chapter 9] by State law or by a
governmental officer or organization empowered by State law” to
authorize a Chapter 9 filing.293 The requirement that a state
authorize its municipalities to file is one that has developed over
the lifetime of the municipal bankruptcy law. The act that the
Bekins Court found to be constitutional contained no requirement
of state authorization, but the Court nevertheless found that the
statute was consistent with the Tenth Amendment because it
290. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012) (providing that “[a]n entity may be a
debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity” is “specifically
authorized”); In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 692 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
291. See Tung, supra note 3, at 888–89 (“The basic purpose for federal
municipal bankruptcy law—Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code—is the same as
for private corporations reorganizing under Chapter 11: to allow a debtor a
breathing spell from creditors’ collection efforts and to enable it to formulate a
repayment plan with creditors.”).
292. See id. at 890 (discussing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994).
293. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2).
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prohibited “interference with the fiscal or governmental affairs”
of a municipality and because it required that the debtor
municipality be permitted by state law to carry out its plan of
adjustment.294 Courts after Bekins interpreted the municipal
bankruptcy law as an opt-out statute: a state was not required to
affirmatively authorize a municipality to file for bankruptcy, but
it could prohibit its municipalities from doing so.295
The 1976 amendments to Chapter IX included state
authorization as a requirement for entry into the municipal
bankruptcy process. As a result of those amendments, a
municipality was required to allege that it was generally
authorized by state law to file for bankruptcy.296 Lawrence King,
a leading bankruptcy scholar at the time, viewed this as an opt-in
requirement that necessitated an affirmative state act.297 He
expressed concern that the general authorization requirement
might deprive a state of flexibility in determining whether a
municipality within the state should file. King speculated that a
city facing an unexpected financial crisis in a state that had no
authorizing legislation on its books might unnecessarily languish
in its financial crisis while the state legislature acted to pass the
294. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1937). The debtor in Bekins
had been authorized by its state, California, to file for bankruptcy. Id. at 47.
295. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 508–09
(1942) (discussing the law of the state of New Jersey, which “expressly prohibits
any municipality to avail itself of a federal bankruptcy act” unless approved by
the New Jersey Municipal Finance Commission); Mission Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Texas, 116 F.2d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1940) (stating that a state “can forbid its
creature to seek a bankruptcy composition,” making the legislature “the judge of
whether a composition should be sought, rather than leave the question to the
governing body of the subdivision”); see also King, supra note 23, at 1159
(explaining that prior to 1976, bankruptcy law did not require states to
affirmatively authorize municipal bankruptcy filings but that states could
prohibit their municipalities from filing for bankruptcy).
296. See Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 84, 90 Stat. 315, 317
(1976) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 404 (1976)) (“Any State’s political subdivision or
public agency or instrumentality, which is generally authorized to file a petition
under this chapter by the legislature, or by a governmental officer or
organization empowered by State law to authorize the filing of a petition, is
eligible for relief under this chapter . . . .”); King, supra note 23, at 1160 (stating
that Section 84 “provides that there must be general authorization to file a
petition under Chapter IX” (emphasis added)).
297. See King, supra note 23, at 1160 (explaining that “[t]he general
authorization can be accomplished by state legislation at any time; it need not
be enacted specifically in response to a particular situation”).
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necessary legislation.298 According to King, the prior requirement
that a city could file unless prohibited from filing was a superior
way to ensure that states played an affirmative role in deciding
how to resolve their cities’ financial crises.299
Not all courts interpreted the general authorization
requirement as a mandate that a state opt in to the federal
bankruptcy regime, resulting in a non-uniform standard for state
consent. Although some courts interpreted the general
authorization requirement to require an affirmative act by the
state allowing municipalities to file,300 others found authorization
to file for bankruptcy if the state had authorized a municipality to
borrow money, enter into contracts, or sue and defend suits.301
When Bridgeport filed for bankruptcy, the court found that the
city was authorized to file, despite objections by both the state
attorney general and a review board that the state created to
oversee the city’s finances.302 The bankruptcy court held that
although the general authorization requirement necessitated
some affirmative act by the state to allow the city to file for
bankruptcy, the state had given such authorization by granting
the city home rule authority over its borrowing, finances, and
property.303
298. Id.
299. See id. (stating that the law of “prohibition” should have been retained
because “states would have retained the power to determine whether they
should permit their [municipalities] to utilize the Bankruptcy Act” without
“requiring an affirmative act of the legislature which at times may be
difficult . . . to accomplish”).
300. See In re Carroll Twp. Auth., 119 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990)
(interpreting the legislative history to the 1976 amendments as requiring an
affirmative act by the state); Dubrow, supra note 3, at 555–56 (explaining the
differing interpretations of the general authorization requirement).
301. See, e.g., In re Vills. at Castle Rock Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 82
(D. Colo. 1990) (concluding that a special district was generally authorized to
file for bankruptcy because Colorado law allowed it to, among other things,
bring suits, borrow money, and manage, control, and supervise all of its
business affairs); In re Greene Cty. Hosp., 59 B.R. 388, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Miss.
1986) (interpreting the legislative history to require a broad reading of the
general authorization requirement).
302. Dubrow, supra note 3, at 555.
303. In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 696 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). The
court later dismissed Bridgeport’s petition because it found that the city, when
it filed its petition, was not insolvent as required by § 109(c)(3). In re City of
Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
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Congress resolved the confusion over the meaning of the
general authorization requirement in 1994. The 1994
amendments to the Code added the current requirement that a
municipality be specifically authorized by its state to file for
bankruptcy.304
The
specific
authorization
requirement
implements the original vision for a municipal bankruptcy
chapter as stated by the Court in Bekins: it allows the state to
“invite[] the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its
agency which the State itself is powerless to rescue.”305 A state
may impose its own conditions on access to Chapter 9 and thus
design a framework for state participation in developing a
rehabilitation plan for its municipalities with the help of the
bankruptcy court. In the next section, I discuss the various ways
in which states have implemented this specific authorization
requirement and discuss how they further, or fail to further, the
goals of Chapter 9.
B. Implementation of State Authorization
Although Congress enacted the original municipal
bankruptcy law to allow states to invite the power of federal law
to remedy financial problems that the states, on their own, could
not remedy, not all states have laws that reflect this purpose.
Twenty-seven states permit at least some of their municipalities
to file for bankruptcy.306 The remaining states have no statute
addressing the issue, with the exception of Georgia, which
prohibits its municipalities from filing,307 and Illinois, which does
not authorize its cities to file but gives a Financial Planning and
Supervision Commission the power to recommend that a

304. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat.
4106 (1994) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012)) (amending § 109(c)(2) of
Title 11 by striking “generally authorized” and inserting “specifically
authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name”); Tung, supra note 3, at
890 (discussing the 1994 amendments).
305. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938).
306. See H. SLAYTON DABNEY, JR. ET AL., MUNICIPALITIES IN PERIL: THE ABI
GUIDE TO CHAPTER 9, at 75–88 (2d ed. 2013) (providing a list of state statutes
authorizing Chapter 9 filings).
307. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (2013).
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municipality file a Chapter 9 petition.308 Many states that do not
authorize their municipalities to file for bankruptcy also lack a
state program to intervene in municipal financial distress. 309
Even in states that authorize their municipalities to file for
Chapter 9, bankruptcy authorization and state oversight do not
always go hand in hand. Several states allow their municipalities
to file for bankruptcy without any restrictions other than those
imposed by the Bankruptcy Code.310 These statutes contemplate
no pre-bankruptcy state fiscal oversight, nor do they mandate
any role for the state during the Chapter 9 case. The absence of a
pre-bankruptcy state oversight requirement does not mean that
the state cannot provide fiscal oversight in bankruptcy,311 but it
means that the extent of such oversight will be uncertain until a
municipality files for bankruptcy. It is in the states that require
no state involvement in a municipality’s decision to file for
bankruptcy that the fear that Chapter 9 will do nothing to
remedy the conditions that led to a municipality’s financial ills
rings most true. Alabama, the home of the largest municipal
bankruptcy ever filed until Detroit’s filing, is one of those
states.312 Not only does Alabama lack a municipal oversight
program but the state refused to intervene to help Jefferson

308. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 320/9(b)(4) (2013).
309. See PEW REPORT, supra note 127, at 9–10 (providing a state-by-state
listing of bankruptcy authorization and state oversight programs).
310. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-603 (2013) (authorizing any taxing
district in the state to file for bankruptcy); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66.400 (West
2013) (authorizing municipalities other than counties to file for bankruptcy
without any conditions); MO. REV. STAT. § 427.100 (2013) (authorizing any
municipality or political subdivision to file for bankruptcy); OKLA. STAT. tit. 62,
§ 283 (2013) (authorizing municipal corporations and political subdivisions to
file for bankruptcy).
311. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (providing for the reservation of state power to
control municipalities).
312. See ALA. CODE § 11-81-3 (2013) (declaring that the governing body of
any county, city, town, or municipal body has the power to file a bankruptcy
petition and giving the state’s permission for such a filing). The language of this
statute raised an eligibility question in Jefferson County’s case because the
statute allows municipalities that “shall authorize the issuance of funding or
refunding bonds” to file for bankruptcy, and Jefferson County had issued
warrants, not bonds. In re Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 469 B.R. 92, 98 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 2012).
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County resolve its financial difficulties without filing for
bankruptcy. 313
Some states impose stronger bankruptcy governance controls
by requiring a municipality to obtain the approval of a public
official before filing for bankruptcy. Some of these statutes are
unclear as to the level of governance that the state will provide.
For example, Connecticut’s statute requires that a municipality
obtain the written consent of the governor before filing for
bankruptcy, but the statute says nothing about the state’s
involvement in a Chapter 9 case.314 Louisiana’s statute requires
both the governor and the attorney general to approve the petition
before any municipality can file for Chapter 9.315 The Louisiana
statute also requires the governor and attorney general to approve
the plan of adjustment, although it does not require that the
governor and attorney general be involved in developing the
plan.316 Moreover, the Louisiana statute provides no guidelines for
the approval or disapproval of a petition or plan.317 In these states,
there is a loose tie between state oversight and bankruptcy
authorization in that the state must be involved in the
municipality’s decision to file for Chapter 9, although it does not
appear that bankruptcy is incorporated into a state municipal
oversight program.

313. PEW REPORT, supra note 127, at 9, 27. In one important respect, the
state of Alabama exacerbated Jefferson County’s financial problems when it
refused to allow the county to impose an occupational tax. See In re Jefferson
Cnty., Ala., 474 B.R. 228, 237 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012) (explaining the rejection
of the county’s tax by the Alabama Supreme Court and the legislature’s
subsequent refusal to enact a replacement tax).
314. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-566 (2013) (requiring the written consent of
the governor).
315. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:619 (2012) (prohibiting a municipality
from filing for bankruptcy “without the consent, approval and authority of the
state through the governor and the Attorney General”).
316. See id. § 39:620 (giving the governor and attorney general the discretion
to approve or disapprove the plan of readjustment). The statute raises an
interesting federalism issue in that it allows the state officials to reject a plan of
adjustment after its confirmation by the bankruptcy court.
317. Id.; see also Lauren M. Wolfe, Note, The Next Financial Hurricane?
Rethinking Municipal Bankruptcy in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 555, 577 (2012)
(explaining that the statute lacks any factors for the State Bond Commission to
consider in deciding whether a municipality should file for Chapter 9).
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Several states have oversight programs that allow the state to
intervene in municipal finances. North Carolina, whose municipal
financial oversight program is considered to be the “gold standard”
for such programs, and New Jersey, which is also known for
providing more assistance to its cities than most states,
implemented their programs soon after the Great Depression
brought a wave of municipal bond defaults.318 These programs
provide budget oversight and intervention in the event of a default
on the part of a municipality.319 Kentucky also has a Depressionera statute that allows the state to “assist counties whose financial
affairs have become so involved that they have seemed to be
beyond local solution and . . . to curb deplorable practices due to
inefficiency, carelessness, or in some instances, quasi criminality
in the handling of county finances in utter disregard of the public
welfare.”320
Kentucky and New Jersey have integrated the bankruptcy
process into their state oversight programs. In Kentucky, a county
may file for bankruptcy only if two state officials approve its
petition and proposed plan of adjustment.321 Once the county files,
it may amend its plan only if the same state officials approve of the
amendments. 322 Although Kentucky law does not require that a
county participate in a state oversight program before filing for
bankruptcy, a county may ask the state for its assistance in
318. PEW REPORT, supra note 127, at 33–36; Natalie Cohen,
Intergovernmental Theater: Spotlight on Michigan, Wells Fargo Securities
Municipal Securities Research Municipal Commentary, Jan. 16, 2013.
319. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-7 to -42 (2013) (codifying the North Carolina
Local Government Budget and Fiscal Control Act); id. § 159-176 (authorizing
the North Carolina Local Government Commission to assist a local government
in refinancing or adjusting its debt); Donald H. Elliott, Proposed Fiscal
Monitoring Legislation in New York: A Comparative Analysis, 8 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 109, 113–19 (1979) (explaining New Jersey’s fiscal oversight of its
municipalities).
320. Lincoln Nat’l Bank v. Cnty. Debt Comm’n, 172 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Ky.
1943). See generally Glenn D. Morrow, County Debt Difficulties in Kentucky (pts.
1 & 2), 31 KY. L.J. 122, 242 (1942–1943), for an early explanation of the law.
321. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66.400 (West 2013) (providing that “the state
local debt officer and the state local finance officer” must approve the petition
and proposed plan of adjustment before “[a]ny taxing agency or instrumentality,
as defined in Chapter IX of the Federal Bankruptcy Act,” may file a petition as
provided in the Federal Bankruptcy Act).
322. Id.
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restructuring county debt, and the state may intervene in a
county’s finances if the county is in default on any indebtedness.323
New Jersey has a similar statute, which requires the state’s
municipal finance commission to approve both the petition324 and
the plan of adjustment.325 A municipality that is unable to pay its
debts can apply for state oversight,326 and the state can place a
defaulting municipality under state supervision on the request of
the holder of the unpaid bonds or notes.327 When a municipality is
placed under state oversight, the municipal finance commission
appoints an auditor to recommend a budget for the municipality
and to approve contracts and capital improvements.328
The existence of a state oversight program does not
necessarily mean that the state integrates Chapter 9 into that
program. North Carolina requires approval of the Local
Government Commission before any municipality can file for
bankruptcy, but the statute is unclear regarding any involvement
by the commission in the Chapter 9 case.329 Moreover, some
323. Id. § 66.320.
324. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27-40 (West 2013) (providing that “[a]ny
county, municipality, school district or other political subdivision of this State”
shall not file a petition under the municipal bankruptcy act “unless the approval
of the municipal finance commission . . . be first had and obtained”).
325. See id. § 52:27-42 (“No plan of readjustment filed with or in the
proceedings upon any such petition shall be approved by the court or put into
temporary effect or finally confirmed without the approval of the commission.”).
326. Id. If a “municipality is not in a position to meet its obligations when
due,” it may institute a civil action in the Superior Court. Id. If the court finds
that “the municipality is so unable to meet its obligations, it may enter
judgment to that effect.” Id. Upon such entry, “the commission shall function in
such municipality with all the powers and duties conferred by this chapter.” Id.
327. Id. The “holder of any notes or bonds of any municipality of this State”
may institute an action against a municipality that is unable to pay its debts.
Id. If the court finds that the municipality is in default, then it may enter
judgment to that effect, and the commission will then exercise its powers and
duties over the defaulting municipality. Id.
328. See id. § 52:27-13.1 (describing the powers and duties of an auditor).
329. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48 (2013) (allowing a North Carolina
municipality to obtain the approval of the Local Government Commission before
filing for bankruptcy); id. § 159-176 (allowing the Local Government
Commission to assist a municipality in adjusting its debts after a default and
allowing the commission to petition a state court for an order directing the
municipality to carry out the plan). Largely due to robust state oversight, no
North Carolina municipality has defaulted on a bond obligation since 1942. PEW
REPORT, supra note 127, at 33.
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states that have an intervention program have no legislation
authorizing their municipalities to file for Chapter 9.330
Recent municipal bankruptcies and threats of same have
caused some states to revisit their authorizing legislation.
California amended its authorization statute after Vallejo filed
for bankruptcy. Vallejo’s bankruptcy was expensive and timeconsuming, and some question whether it brought any benefits at
all to the city.331 California’s statute, enacted at the behest of the
public employee unions,332 requires that a municipality
contemplating bankruptcy must first enter into a confidential
mediation process with its creditors.333 Although its detractors
criticize the statute for potentially delaying a necessary
Chapter 9 filing for a distressed city,334 its supporters contend
that if a municipality is required to negotiate in good faith with
its creditors before filing, it might either avoid Chapter 9 or
develop a prenegotiated plan, thus reducing the duration and cost
of the Chapter 9 case.335 California continues to eschew state
oversight of municipal finances; during the legislative process
330. See PEW REPORT, supra note 127, at 9–10 (listing bankruptcy
authorization statutes and state intervention programs state-by-state).
331. See Denniston, supra note 21, at 273 (explaining that Vallejo’s Chapter
9 took 3 years, cost $13 million, and left a $3.4 million shortfall in the city’s first
post-bankruptcy budget).
332. See Editorial, Cities Could Find Budget Fire Escape Blocked, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/union-317114bankruptcy-pension.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (explaining that the bill
was backed by two public employee unions) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Ed Mendel, In Looming Stockton Bankruptcy, Pensions Won’t
Be Cut, CAPITOL WEEKLY (June 7, 2012), http://capitolweekly.net/in-loomingstockton-bankruptcy-pensions-wont-be-cut/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2013)
(explaining that the unions backed the legislation because they feared, after
Vallejo’s bankruptcy, that cities filing for bankruptcy would break their labor
contracts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
333. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760(a) (West 2013). A municipality may avoid this
process by declaring a fiscal emergency. Id. § 53760(b).
334. See Christine A. Schleppegrell, Ad Hoc Legislation Creates Barriers to A
Chapter 9 Filing, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 48, 48 (2013) (criticizing new state
restrictions on Chapter 9 as creating “an unpredictable pathway to
bankruptcy”).
335. Denniston, supra note 21, at 261. Ms. Denniston helped draft Assembly
Bill 506 (AB 506). AB 506 has not eliminated eligibility fights. See In re City of
Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 795 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (holding, over the objection
of the capital markets creditors, that the city was eligible for Chapter 9 because
it had negotiated in good faith with its creditors).

GOALS AND GOVERNANCE

467

preceding the enactment of the new statute, state leaders insisted
that the bill could not increase the financial burdens on the
state.336 Therefore, although California accepted the Bankruptcy
Code’s invitation to place conditions on the ability of its
municipalities to file, its legislation does nothing to further the
foundational goal of municipal bankruptcy law, which was to
invite the federal power to solve a problem that the state could
not solve on its own.
Other states whose cities have suffered financial threats
have modified their authorization statutes to more explicitly link
the authorization to file for bankruptcy with state oversight. The
Rhode Island legislature enacted its Fiscal Stability Act out of a
concern that Central Falls’ 2010 receivership petition would lead
to other receivership petitions by Rhode Island municipalities.337
A Rhode Island city cannot file for bankruptcy without taking
three intermediate steps, each of which requires the city to
submit to increasing levels of fiscal oversight.338 It is only after
the appointment of a receiver, the third and last of the
intermediate steps, that a city can file for bankruptcy, and the
authorizing statute grants the receiver the power to file the
Chapter 9 petition.339

336. Denniston, supra note 21, at 282.
337. Kishfy, supra note 21, at 350.
338. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-9-5 to -7 (2013) (providing three intermediate
steps that a Rhode Island city or town must take before being able to file for
bankruptcy). First, “[t]he fiscal overseer shall report in writing to the division of
municipal finance if the fiscal overseer concludes that the city or town” meets
one of four conditions, and “[i[f the fiscal overseer believes, at any time, that a
budget commission should be appointed, the fiscal overseer may report that
belief to the division of municipal finance.” Id. § 45-9-5. Second, a budget
commission can be established. Id. § 45-9-6. Third, “[i]f the budget commission
established by § 45-9-5 concludes that its powers are insufficient to restore fiscal
stability to the city or town, it shall notify the director of revenue;” when the
director of revenue receives a statement of the reasons why the budget
commission is unable to restore fiscal stability to the city or town, “the director
of revenue shall appoint a receiver for the city or town for a period as the
director of revenue may determine.” Id. § 45-9-7.
339. Id. § 45-9-7. The statute allows the state to bypass the intermediate
steps in some circumstances. See id. § 45-9-8 (allowing the state’s director of
revenue to appoint a receiver for a city facing a fiscal emergency if
circumstances do not permit the appointment of a fiscal overseer or budget
commission).
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Michigan’s law has a tortured history. In 1988, to respond to
the effects that the 1980s recession had on its cities, Michigan
enacted a law that allowed the state to appoint an emergency
financial manager for a municipality experiencing a financial
emergency.340 Although the statutory allocation of authority
between the emergency financial manager and the municipality’s
elected officials was somewhat unclear, it was widely understood
that the law permitted local officials to exercise all of their
powers other than the budget and fiscal powers that the statute
gave to the emergency financial manager.341 In 2011, as the
financial picture in Detroit and other Michigan cities became
increasingly dire, Michigan enacted a law transforming the
emergency financial manager into an emergency manager.342 The
effect of that law was to allow the state to replace all of a
financially stressed municipality’s elected officials with an official
appointed by the governor.343 Under that law, only the emergency
manager had the power to file a bankruptcy petition for the
municipality with the governor’s approval.344 Michigan voters
rejected that law in 2012 and the legislature quickly responded
with a statute that gives a financially distressed city four choices:
the appointment of an emergency manager, Chapter 9
bankruptcy, mediation with its creditors, or a consent agreement
with the state to reduce its debt.345
340. See Philo, supra note 129, at 83 (describing the enacted law).
341. Id. at 84.
342. See id. at 85 (discussing the Local Government and School District
Fiscal Accountability Act).
343. See Anderson, Radical Experimentation, supra note 113, at 586–91
(explaining the evolution of Michigan’s law and explaining that it had a
disproportionate effect on cities with large African-American populations).
344. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1515(4) (repealed 2012) (stating that
“[u]pon the confirmation of a finding of a financial emergency, the governor
shall declare the local government in receivership and shall appoint an
emergency manager to act for and in the place and stead of the governing body
and the office of chief administrative officer of the local government”); id.
§ 141.1523 (stating that if the emergency manager determines there is “no
reasonable alternative to rectifying the financial emergency of the local
government,” then the emergency manager may recommend to the governor and
state treasurer that the local government be authorized to proceed under Title
11 of the United States Code). The governor must approve this recommendation
in order for the local government to become a debtor under Title 11. Id.
345. See id. § 141.1547 (providing four local government options to address a
financial emergency). Once a financial emergency is confirmed, the governing
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Michigan law grants the emergency manager broad powers.
As under the 2011 law, the emergency manager replaces all of the
affected municipality’s elected officials, who possess only the
powers granted to them by the emergency manager.346 As was
illustrated in the Detroit case, if an emergency manager is
appointed, the emergency manager decides whether to file a
Chapter 9 petition for the city, and can only do so with the
approval of the governor.347 Only the emergency manager has the
authority to act for the municipality during the Chapter 9 case.348
A city in Michigan can file for bankruptcy even if it does not
choose the emergency manager option, but it needs the governor’s
approval to do so. The governor may condition approval on the
appointment of someone to act for the municipality in its
Chapter 9 case.349
body of the local government must by resolution, “within 7 days after the
confirmation of a finding of a financial emergency,” select one of four local
government options to address the financial emergency. Id.; Chris Christoff,
Michigan Lawmakers Approve New Emergency Manager Law, BLOOMBERG (Dec.
27, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-27/michigan-lawmakersapprove-new-emergency-manager-law.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013)
(discussing the repeal of the 2011 law, which “gave the state the power to
appoint an emergency manager or impose a consent agreement” and was
criticized as “undemocratic and an attempt to bust unions”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). On March 14, 2013, the governor of
Michigan appointed an emergency manager for Detroit. Matthew Dolan & Jeff
Bennett, Manager Tapped for Detroit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2013, at A2.
346. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(2) (2013).
347. See id. § 141.1558(1) (“If, in the judgment of the emergency manager,
no reasonable alternative to rectifying the financial emergency of the local
government which is in receivership exists, then the emergency manager may
recommend to the governor and the state treasurer that the local government be
authorized to proceed under chapter 9.”). The governor must approve the
emergency manager’s recommendation in order for the local government to
proceed under Chapter 9. Id. Upon approval, the emergency manager is
empowered “to act exclusively on the local government’s behalf in any such case
under chapter 9.” Id. Immediately before Detroit filed for bankruptcy, several
suits were filed in state court by city workers, retirees, and pension boards,
claiming that the Michigan Constitution does not allow the governor to
authorize a bankruptcy filing because doing so could cause pension benefits to
be modified in contravention of the constitution. Brent Snavely, Pension Funds
Filed Lawsuit Earlier than Planned to Beat Detroit Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (July 18, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article/20130718/NEWS01/
307180125/pension-funds-lawsuit-chapter-9-bankruptcy-kevyn-orr (last visited
Nov. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
348. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1558(1) (2013).
349. Id. § 141.1566.
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The Rhode Island and Michigan approaches to Chapter 9
illustrate that some of the academic concerns about Chapter 9
governance can be and have been alleviated by states. In these
states, the question is not whether there is restructuring
oversight of a dysfunctional city, it is whether the oversight is
appropriate. Receivership and emergency manager statutes have
been criticized and challenged on several grounds: such statutes
violate home rule statutes that give the citizens of municipalities
the right to govern themselves;350 they have a disproportionate
impact on communities with large poor351 and AfricanAmerican352 populations; and they do not anticipate or facilitate
the kind of nonfinancial structural reform, such as the
consolidation of municipalities, that might be necessary to truly
alleviate a city’s financial distress.353 Although these are
important criticisms, they are unrelated to the efficacy of
Chapter 9. When viewed alone, all Chapter 9 can do is reduce a
municipality’s debt. In enacting municipal bankruptcy
legislation, however, Congress did not intend for bankruptcy law
to stand alone in resolving municipal financial distress. In the
next section, I explain Pennsylvania’s still-evolving process of
revising its distressed municipalities statute in order to illustrate
what happens when business and political leaders lose sight of

350. See, e.g., Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 574–75 (R.I. 2011)
(challenging the Rhode Island oversight statute); Kishfy, supra note 21, at 369–
77 (explaining Rhode Island’s home rule tradition); Lyle Kossis, Note,
Examining the Conflict Between Municipal Receivership and Local Autonomy,
98 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1121–28 (2012) (explaining the incompatibility of home rule
and municipal receivership).
351. See Philo, supra note 129, at 101–05 (arguing that Michigan and Rhode
Island’s “statutes suspend citizens’ right to vote in poorer communities that are
particularly vulnerable to economic cycles and corresponding downturns”). “The
laws suspend the right to vote, by replacing local elected officials with state
appointed managers and receivers.” Id. at 101.
352. See Anderson, Radical Experimentation, supra note 113, at 590 (“The
four cities already approved for intervention have proportionately large AfricanAmerican populations: Benton Harbor is 91.4% African-American, Flint is
59.5%, Pontiac is 55.3%, and Ecorse is 48.6%.”).
353. See id. at 582 (explaining that granting fiscal control over a city to the
state does nothing to “ameliorate structural causes of financial distress, like
concentrated poverty, the loss of middle-class jobs across a region, or local
borders that fragment a single metropolitan area into socioeconomically
segregated cities”).
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the fact that Chapter 9 was enacted to assist, rather than thwart,
state efforts to rehabilitate their municipalities.
VI. Authorization Meets Governance, Eventually: Pennsylvania’s
Story
The story of Pennsylvania’s response to its capital city’s
financial problems contains several lessons about municipal
bankruptcy. It shows how confusion reigns when little-used laws
are dusted off and considered as tools to solve pressing problems.
Because Chapter 9 is so rarely used, decisionmakers may be
unaware of its interplay with state oversight laws. Harrisburg’s
business and government leaders viewed bankruptcy and state
intervention as competing, rather than complementary, methods
for
resolving
municipal
financial
distress.
Their
misunderstanding of the interaction between Chapter 9 and state
recovery schemes led, for a short time, to an undesirable
legislative result in Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania’s body of law regarding authorization to file for
bankruptcy illustrates both the reactive nature of state oversight
laws and their interplay with bankruptcy authorization. The
bankruptcy authorization rules for most cities, counties, and
towns in Pennsylvania are found in the Municipalities Financial
Recovery Act, also known as Act 47.354 Enacted in 1987 to address
the municipal financial distress caused by the contraction of the
steel industry in the western part of the state,355 Act 47
established a financial intervention program administered by the
Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic
Development (DCED).356 A municipality that receives a distress
354. 53 PA. CONS. STAT § 11701.101 (2013). Philadelphia is the exception. It
cannot file for bankruptcy without the Governor’s approval, a restriction placed
upon the city in 1991, when the state enacted a recovery statute for that city. Id.
§ 12720.211; see also Drew Patrick Gannon, Comment, An Analysis of
Pennsylvania’s Legislative Programs for Financially Distressed Municipalities
and the Reaction of Municipal Labor Unions, 98 DICK. L. REV. 281, 291–94
(1994) (explaining the history of the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental
Cooperation Authority Act for Cities of the First Class).
355. See Gannon, supra note 354, at 281 (explaining the history of Act 47).
356. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.103 (defining “Department” as “[t]he
Department of Community Affairs of the Commonwealth”). The Department of
Community Affairs was merged with the Department of Commerce in 1996 to
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determination must work with a coordinator appointed by the
state to develop a financial recovery plan.357 Although
commentators lauded Act 47 as an example of proactive state
oversight over its cities,358 it has not been a great success in
reviving Pennsylvania’s municipalities. The state has accepted
twenty-seven municipalities into the program, but only six have
exited.359 Six cities have been in the program for more than
twenty-five years.360
The original proponents of Act 47 did not design the program
as an exclusive alternative to Chapter 9. The legislature revisited
Pennsylvania’s bankruptcy authorization statute at the time it
developed Act 47 and included the preconditions for Chapter 9
filing in Act 47.361 Before June 2011, municipalities could file for
become the Department of Community and Economic Development. See 71 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1709.301(a)(9) (transferring the powers of the Department of
Community Affairs under the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act to the
Department of Community and Economic Development).
357. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.221. A municipality in the program may
receive permission to raise its taxes above the legal limits and is eligible for
loans and grants from the state. Id. § 11701.123.
358. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 473 (explaining some of the
benefits of state intervention, using Scranton’s Act 47 status as an example). In
2002, Fred Tung cited Act 47 as possibly “particularly instructive insofar as it
has actually gotten some use,” and also used Scranton as an example. Tung,
supra note 3, at 917 n.146.
359. List of Act 47 Distress Determinations, PA. DEP’T OF CMTY. & ECON. DEV.
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.newpa.com/local-government/services-we-providelocal-governments/request-assistance/list-of-act-47-distress-determinations (last
visited Oct. 15, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Twenty years after its entry into Act 47, Scranton not only remained distressed
but was frequently reported to be considering a Chapter 9 filing. See, e.g., David
Falchek, Some Tout Bankruptcy as Scranton’s Way Out, Others Say It’s No
Picnic, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE (June 27, 2012), http://thetimestribune.com/news/some-tout-bankruptcy-as-scranton-s-way-out-others-say-it-sno-picnic-1.1335580 (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (discussing Scranton’s
bankruptcy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Municipal
Bankruptcy: The Sadness of Scranton, THE ECONOMIST (July 21, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21559382 (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (same) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mary Williams Walsh, Crushed
by Promises, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2012, at B1 (same).
360. See List of Act 47 Distress Determinations, PA. DEP’T OF CMTY. & ECON.
DEV. (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.newpa.com/local-government/services-weprovide-local-governments/request-assistance/list-of-act-47-distress-determina
tions (last visited Dec. 25, 2013) (listing six cities that joined the program before
January 9, 1989) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
361. See J. Pub. Hearing on Act 47 Before the H. Urban Affairs Comm., H.
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Chapter 9 if one of five conditions was met, and the law at that
time allowed a municipality to file for bankruptcy without the
prior approval of any state officer.362 Not only does Act 47 set
forth the conditions under which a municipality may file for
Chapter 9,363 it mandates that if a city is not in the Act 47
program at the time it files for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy filing
will trigger a distress determination that will place the city in the
program.364 The distress determination allows the state to
appoint an Act 47 coordinator, who must develop a debt
adjustment plan that can be confirmed by the bankruptcy
court.365 Act 47 therefore anticipated both that a municipality
under state oversight might be required to resort to bankruptcy,
and that a municipality not yet under state oversight that
decided to file for bankruptcy would then receive state guidance
in the bankruptcy. The original Act 47 included the possibility of
a municipal bankruptcy filing as a necessary component of a
municipal financial recovery scheme with the state providing the
necessary reorganizational governance in Chapter 9.
The possibility of a bankruptcy filing by Harrisburg started
to emerge in the press roughly two years before the city filed its
petition.366 The mere mention of Chapter 9 triggered a deluge of
Local Gov’t Comm., S. Cmty., Econ. & Recreational Dev. Comm., and S. Local
Gov’t Comm., 2011 Leg., 195th Sess. 14 (Pa. 2011) [hereinafter Act 47 Hearing]
(statement of Michael Gasbarre, Exec. Dir., Local Gov’t Comm’n of the Pa. Gen.
Assembly) (explaining that one of the original objectives of the task force that
proposed Act 47 was the “creation of an updated procedure to enable distressed
municipalities to file for municipal debt readjustment action under Federal
law”).
362. See Moringiello, supra note 21, at 249 (explaining Pennsylvania law
before June 30, 2012).
363. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.261 (2013) (authorizing municipalities
“to file a municipal debt adjustment action pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code” if
one of four conditions is met).
364. Id. § 11701.262. This provision of the statute has been used only once,
in the bankruptcy of Westfall Township, a small municipality that was rendered
insolvent by a large judgment. See Act 47 Hearing, supra note 361, at 89
(statement of James H. Roberts) (explaining that Westfall Township was the
first municipality in the history of Act 47 to invoke its bankruptcy provisions).
365. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.262.
366. See Editorial, Harrisburg: Where Does City Go From Here?, HARRISBURG
PATRIOT-NEWS (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.pennlive.com/editorials/index.
ssf/2009/09/where_does_city_go_from_here.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2013)
(“Harrisburg has three viable options: Sell assets, enter the state’s ‘distressed
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opposition from state officials and business leaders. Sprinkled
throughout those press accounts were reports of high-level
misunderstandings about the effects of a bankruptcy filing.367
Business leaders and politicians seemed unable to distinguish
bankruptcy from insolvency, expressing concern about the effect
of a Chapter 9 filing on the city’s bond rating when Harrisburg’s
bonds had been rated five grades below investment grade for over
a year.368 The very highest level of state government revealed a
fundamental misunderstanding of Act 47’s integration of
bankruptcy law and state oversight when then-Governor Ed
Rendell warned that if Harrisburg filed for bankruptcy, a
bankruptcy judge, not the citizens of Harrisburg, would control
the city’s destiny.369

city’ program or declare bankruptcy.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
367. For example, the mayors of three distressed Pennsylvania cities,
Harrisburg, Reading, and Scranton, described bankruptcy “as creating a
perception to the business community, the people and the rest of the world that
Harrisburg isn’t solvent and would be unable to pay its bills.” Scott La Mar,
Mayors of Harrisburg, Reading, and Scranton Say that Bankruptcy Is Not the
Answer, WITF SMART TALK (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.witf.org/smart-talk/
2011/11/mayors-of-harrisburg-reading-and-scranton-say-banjruptcy-niot-the-sn
wer.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Sharon Smith, Bankruptcy for Harrisburg Could Help
Taxpayers But Taint Region, State, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS (June 13, 2011),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/06/bankruptcy_could_help_tax
payer.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (quoting David Black, the president and
CEO of the Harrisburg Regional Chamber of Commerce as saying that “[t]he
impact of bankruptcy is more than just the city of Harrisburg. It’s on the
commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and it’s on every municipality in
Pennsylvania”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
368. See Dunstan McNichol, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Bond Rating Cut by
Moody’s, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=apS4yfEwYa9E (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (reporting on
the downgrading of Harrisburg’s municipal bonds) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
369. See Heather Long, Harrisburg and Bankruptcy: The Facts and The
Myths, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS (Sept. 18, 2010), http://www.pennlive.com/
editorials/index.ssf/2010/09/harrisburg_and_bankrtupcy_the.html (last visited
Oct. 15, 2013) (quoting Governor Rendell as saying “if the city goes into
bankruptcy, it will be the bankruptcy judge who decides. This step is to be
avoided so that Harrisburg and its elected officials can control their own
destiny”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). As explained
above, nothing could be farther from the truth.
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When Harrisburg entered the Act 47 program a year before it
filed for bankruptcy, political leaders at the state and local level
split into two camps: the Act 47 camp and the bankruptcy
camp.370 Business leaders were firmly in the Act 47 camp.371 This
split illustrates the fact that even in states like Pennsylvania,
where the authorization to file for bankruptcy is contained within
the statute providing for state intervention in the fiscal affairs of
its municipalities, policy makers can lose sight of the relationship
between state intervention and Chapter 9. Harrisburg’s city
council was at an impasse; a majority of the council members
were unable to agree with the mayor on almost anything, having
rejected both the Act 47 coordinator’s proposed plan as well as an
alternative Act 47 plan proposed by the mayor.372 The standoff
culminated in a late-night bankruptcy filing unsupported by the
mayor that was dismissed six weeks later because of the city’s
failure to meet the Chapter 9 eligibility requirements.373 For that
reason, the state was justifiably concerned that a bankruptcy
proceeding would burn through money without a successful
resolution. If the council could not agree on whether to file for
bankruptcy, it certainly would not have been able to agree on a
Chapter 9 plan to adjust the city’s debts.
In June 2011, three and a half months before Harrisburg
filed for bankruptcy, the state legislature passed a law
prohibiting Harrisburg and other cities that had received a
distress determination from the DCED pursuant to Act 47 from
filing for Chapter 9 altogether.374 The proponents of the ban
370. See Charles Thompson, Most at Harrisburg Fiscal Hearing Want
Bankruptcy, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.
pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/10/most_at_harrisburg_fiscal_hear.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (identifying the mayor of Harrisburg as supporting
entering Act 47, but “most of the dozen or so constituents who testified” as
supporting proceeding straight to bankruptcy) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
371. See id. (recognizing the president of the chamber of commerce as
favoring Act 47 because it could “provide just the guidance that city leaders
need to get past their political and personal divisions and begin focusing on
solutions”).
372. See Moringiello, supra note 21, at 243–44 (discussing the circumstances
leading up to Harrisburg’s filing).
373. Id.
374. Act of June 30, 2011 (Act 26), P.L 159, No. 26 § 1.5 (using a tax code
amendment to prohibit cities “of the third class” from filing a petition for relief
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claimed that Harrisburg could adequately solve its problems in
Act 47.375 Rather than strengthening its financial governance
over its distressed cities, Pennsylvania left its most troubled
cities to languish in a state program of dubious success without
the leverage over recalcitrant creditors that a bankruptcy threat
can provide. In hindsight, the state government was trying to
solve an obvious governance problem; the mayor of Harrisburg
and the majority of the City Council were at an impasse, and they
could not agree on an Act 47 plan. If they could not agree on an
Act 47 plan outside of bankruptcy, it was unlikely that they could
ever agree on a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment with their creditors.
Act 47, in its pre-2011 form, left the mayor and other
members of the municipality’s government in their roles with full
powers in all cases. On the one hand, this feature of Act 47
respected the democratic process by allowing those chosen by a
municipality’s residents to govern the municipality. On the other,
however, Act 47 presumed the existence of a functioning city
government led by leaders who agreed to cooperate with state
intervention. The reality in Harrisburg did not mirror these
assumptions. As a result, Pennsylvania moved to strengthen
governance over its distressed cities shortly after Harrisburg filed
for bankruptcy. Immediately after Harrisburg filed for
bankruptcy, the legislature passed a bill allowing the governor to
appoint a receiver for a city if that city is insolvent and has not
adopted an Act 47 plan.376 At the time that law was passed, the
under Chapter 9 “or any other Federal bankruptcy law,” despite the provisions
of Act 47). Pennsylvania classifies its cities by population, and this prohibition
was limited to cities of the Third Class. Id. Although most Pennsylvania cities
are cities of the Third Class, the prohibition was enacted as a reaction to
Harrisburg’s financial crisis. See In re City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 763
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011) (explaining the temporary prohibition on filing
applicable to cities of the Third Class); see also Moringiello, supra note 21, at
243 (discussing the legislation changes Pennsylvania made as a result of the
financial crisis in Harrisburg).
375. See Marc Levy, Bill to Stop Harrisburg Bankruptcy Goes to Corbett,
YORK DISPATCH (July 8, 2011), http://www.yorkdispatch.com/news/ci_18387764
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (identifying state senator Jeffrey Piccola as
supporting the proposition that “[t]he city can address its problems through a
law called Act 47”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
376. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.702 (2013) (providing for the
appointment of a receiver by the Governor); see also Moringiello, supra note 21,
at 243 (discussing the timeline of legislative action related to Harrisburg’s
bankruptcy proceedings).
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bankruptcy ban was still in place. Today, if a receiver is
appointed, only the receiver can file a Chapter 9 petition for the
city.377
Receiverships are controversial. They should be; they remove
the choice of leaders from the residents of a city.378 Pennsylvania,
however, had an almost toothless state intervention scheme. The
state was unable to do anything to resolve Harrisburg’s problems
because of the acrimony on the City Council. The drafters of Act
47 never anticipated that a city would reject a plan.379 The
receivership provision therefore provided governance controls
that were missing from the state intervention program. Although
Pennsylvania has strengthened its ability to intervene in a city’s
financial matters, Act 47 still does nothing to address the
problems that arise from the state’s highly fragmented municipal
structure in which thousands of municipalities, some very small,
each provide their own public services.380
Pennsylvania’s story clarifies a rationale that some authors
have ascribed to municipal bankruptcy. Several scholars have
suggested that Chapter 9 exists as a political tool: both Adam
Levitin, writing about the wisdom of a bankruptcy chapter for
states, and Clayton Gillette, writing about Chapter 9, have
surmised that one use of a bankruptcy chapter for public entities
could be to provide political cover for state or city officials in
making unpopular decisions.381 Gillette has cited Harrisburg’s
377. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.706. Today, no municipality in
Pennsylvania may file for bankruptcy without the approval of DCED. Id.
§ 11701.261.
378. See supra notes 350–53 and accompanying text (discussing
receiverships).
379. See Act 47 Hearing, supra note 361, at 19 (statement of Michael
Gasbarre, Exec. Dir., Local Gov’t Comm’n of the Pa. Gen. Assembly) (“It is an
accurate statement that those who crafted Act 47 never envisioned a situation
where a distressed municipality would fail to adopt either the coordinator’s
solvency plan or an alternative that could be drafted by a municipality’s chief
executive officer or governing body.”).
380. See PA. ECON. LEAGUE, BEYOND ACT 47: A CALL TO ACTION (2013),
http://pelcentral.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Beyond-Act-47-_revised_.pdf
(“Pennsylvania’s municipalities are broken into thousands of little puzzle pieces
with each one offering—and funding—its own distinct brand of public safety and
public works services.”).
381. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 16, at 319–20 (discussing the strategic use
of municipal bankruptcy); Levitin, supra note 16, at 1446 (discussing
bankruptcy as a political tool).
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failed bankruptcy as an example of a strategic use of Chapter 9
by a city to escape unfavorable conditions placed by the state on
its assistance.382 Bankruptcy can indeed be a political tool, but in
a different way from that suggested by Gillette and Levitin. A
city’s credible threat to file for Chapter 9 can serve as a wake-up
call to state officials who have paid little attention to their state’s
authorization statutes. In Pennsylvania, a state with many
distressed municipalities, the bankruptcy threat by the state
capital did just that. Harrisburg’s dispute with the state led to a
short-lived absolute ban on bankruptcy filings by certain cities,
but it also forced the state to grapple with the governance
deficiencies in its municipal distress intervention program. Once
the state restored Chapter 9 as an option, which it did in
November 2012, Harrisburg’s creditors moved towards an out-ofbankruptcy resolution of the city’s debt problems.383
VII. Where the Holes Are: Issues for Judicial or Legislative
Resolution
Because so few general-purpose municipalities of any size
had filed for Chapter 9 before Vallejo, California, filed in 2008, it
is difficult to evaluate, as an empirical matter, the success of
Chapter 9 in relieving a city of its financial distress so that the
city, with the help of its state, can return to viability. Vallejo, a
city in a state that has refused to provide reorganizational
oversight, continues to struggle,384 and the bankruptcy of Central
382. Clayton P. Gillette, Bankruptcy and Its By-Products: A Comment on
Skeel, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 1129, 1141 (2013); see also Gillette, supra note 16, at
286 (“[L]ocal officials may use the threat of bankruptcy to reduce the conditions
that states place on a proposed bailout.”). As explained above, Pennsylvania
placed more restrictive controls on Harrisburg after it made good on its threat to
file for bankruptcy.
383. See Donald Gilliland, Why Not Bankruptcy for Harrisburg’s Debt? A
Closer Look at The Receiver’s Strategy, PENNLIVE.COM (July 24, 2013, 1:05 PM),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2013/07/why_not_bankruptcy_for_h
arrisb.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (explaining how the availability of
Chapter 9 as an option helped the receiver for Harrisburg to negotiate with the
city’s creditors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
384. See Bobby White, In Vallejo, Scars Still Visible, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19.
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020455590457716701345
5352608.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (explaining the cuts in public services
that persist after Vallejo’s filing and the attendant concerns about crime; also
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Falls, in a state that provided robust rehabilitative governance,
had a positive effect on that city’s credit and that of other Rhode
Island cities.385 Harrisburg is on track to solve its problems under
Pennsylvania’s strengthened oversight statute without resort to
bankruptcy.386
The foregoing illustrates that Chapter 9 may only be as
effective as the state municipal oversight structure within which
it operates. This is not a new observation; in the 1930s, the
original proponents of a municipal bankruptcy law feared that
any such law would be useless without it being integrated into
state plans for municipal rehabilitation.387 Because the design of
municipal bankruptcy law anticipates that the states will provide
reorganizational governance over the debtor, concerns about the
effectiveness of Chapter 9 should not focus on its absence of
Chapter 11-style governance controls. Rather, questions about
the efficacy of Chapter 9 should fall into three categories: those
about each state’s acceptance of the Code’s invitation to exercise
pointing out that because Vallejo did not scale back its pension payments in
bankruptcy, it may be unable to make them in the future) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
385. See, e.g., Central Falls Bankruptcy Credit Positive for Rhode Island
Cities: Moody’s, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
09/13/rhodeisland-central-falls-moodys-idUSL1E8KDITQ20120913 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2013) (quoting a Moody’s commentary that approval of Central Falls
bankruptcy “is a credit positive for other distressed Rhode Island cities because
it shows a path to emerging from bankruptcy without defaulting on G.O. debt”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Moody’s Upgrades Formerly
Bankrupt Central Falls, R.I., REUTERS (July 18, 2013), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2013/07/18/usa-rhodeisland-centralfalls-rating-idUSL1N0FO27920
130718 (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (reporting that Moody’s belief “that Central
Falls will maintain its structural balance and keep making its full annual
pension obligations”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Robust
governance was not the only reason the bond market responded positively to the
Central Falls bankruptcy. Shortly before the city filed, the state enacted a law
granting secured status to general obligation bonds, thus giving them priority
over obligations to employees and retirees. R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 45-12-1 (2013).
386. See Emily Previti, State Officials File ‘Harrisburg Strong Plan’ for
Resolving City’s Debt, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS (Aug. 27, 2013),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2013/08/harrisburg_debt_plan_filed.
html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (explaining that the receiver for Harrisburg
filed a debt adjustment plan with the Commonwealth court on August 26, 2013)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
387. See supra notes 249–55 and accompanying text (discussing municipal
bankruptcy legislation and scholarship from the 1930s).
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Chapter 9 governance; those about what the state is accepting if
it allows its cities to file for Chapter 9; and those about the extent
to which a court can exercise bankruptcy governance over a
municipal debtor if a state allows municipal bankruptcy but
declines the invitation to participate in the debtor’s
rehabilitation. In Part V above, I addressed the first category of
questions. In this section, I will address the second and third
categories.
A. Continuing Questions about the Relationship Between State
and Federal Law
The relationship between state law and bankruptcy law is
one that scholars have studied and questioned for decades.
Uncertainty about the relationship between the two is not unique
to municipal bankruptcy; over thirty years ago, shortly after the
passage of the current Code, Theodore Eisenberg pronounced the
Code a failure because of its “inadequate coordination with
preexisting federal and state laws.”388 The proper function of all
types of bankruptcy depends on the interplay between
bankruptcy law and myriad state and other federal laws.389
Uncertainty surrounds Chapter 9 because its rare use has
produced few published judicial opinions interpreting and
applying its provisions. The history of Chapter 9 illustrates an
attempt to strike a careful balance between state and federal
interests, and as large municipalities file for bankruptcy, the
relationship between state and federal law in resolving municipal
financial distress requires further refinement.
The constitutional foundations of municipal bankruptcy law
raise a question of how far bankruptcy law can go to upset state
law entitlements. For example, before Detroit filed for
388. Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV.
953, 953 (1981).
389. See Karen Gross, A Response to J.J. White’s Death and Resurrection of
Secured Credit: Finding Some Trees But Missing the Forest, 12 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 203, 216–17 (2004) (explaining that all Chapter 11 cases “involve the
interplay of other bodies of law, other disciplines and the market”). There are
many examples of bankruptcy law’s dependence on state law. Perhaps the two
most prominent are the Code’s definitions of property of the estate, 11 U.S.C.
§ 541 (2012), and of claims, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
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bankruptcy, several groups sued in state court claiming that
because the Michigan constitution protects employee pensions,390
a bankruptcy filing would be unconstitutional.391 Although the
mere act of filing for Chapter 9 should not violate this
constitutional provision because a plan of adjustment does not
necessarily impair pension rights, the Emergency Manager’s
stated intention to reduce pensions392 will ensure that questions
regarding the relationship between state and federal law will not
disappear.
Two bankruptcy courts have provided an answer to this
question. Retirees in Stockton, California, claimed that the
contracts clause in the California constitution protected their
health benefits even in bankruptcy.393 In that dispute, the court
looked at bankruptcy authorization as an all-or-nothing
proposition: If a state authorizes municipal bankruptcy, it must
accept all of Chapter 9’s provisions, which include the possibility
of a cramdown plan that forces creditors to accept less than what
they are owed.394 In short, a state can condition its cities’ entry
into Chapter 9, but it cannot revise it.395 In his ruling that Detroit
met the eligibility requirements for Chapter 9, Judge Steven
Rhodes relied on the reasoning in Stockton to hold that Chapter 9
allows Detroit to impair its pension obligations, notwithstanding
the prohibition on doing so found in the Michigan Constitution.396
390. See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each
pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions
shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or
impaired thereby.”).
391. Bill Vlasic, Federal Judge Halts Legal Challenges in Detroit Bankruptcy
Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, at A14.
392. CITY OF DETROIT, PROPOSAL TO CREDITORS 109 (2013), http://www.
freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C4206913614.PDF.
393. See Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. City of Stockton, Cal. (In re City of
Stockton, Cal.), 478 B.R. 8, 13 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (“The retirees contend
they have vested contractual rights that are protected from impairment by the
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, a similar clause in the
California Constitution, and by other provisions of California law.”).
394. See id. at 16 (“A state cannot rely on the § 903 reservation of state
power to condition or to qualify, i.e. to ‘cherry pick,’ the application of the
Bankruptcy Code provisions that apply in Chapter 9 cases after such a case has
been filed.”).
395. Id. at 17.
396. Opinion Regarding Eligibility at 74–80, In re City of Detroit, 9:13-bk-

482

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403 (2014)

Assuming that a state must accept Chapter 9 in toto, it is
often unclear exactly what total acceptance means. Where
Chapter 9 incorporates Chapter 11 standards, the incorporation
is sometimes poorly tailored to the realities of municipal financial
distress. For example, in order for a Chapter 9 plan to be
confirmed, the plan must be “in the best interests of creditors.”397
To meet that standard, a Chapter 11 plan must pay all creditors
at least what they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.398
That standard is unworkable in a Chapter 9 case because a
municipality cannot be liquidated, nor can its assets be sold
outside of bankruptcy in a forced sale.399 As a result, courts hold
that a plan of adjustment meets the best interests standard when
the plan is better than all alternatives.400
Although Chapter 9 permits a cramdown plan, a court may
confirm such a plan only if it is “fair and equitable.”401 In
Chapter 11, that standard requires that unsecured creditors be
paid in full before shareholders get anything.402 The standard
does not translate well to Chapter 9; cities do not have
shareholders. Courts have therefore interpreted it to mean that
Chapter 9 creditors will receive all that they “‘can reasonably
expect under the circumstances.’”403 There is very little case law
53846-SWR (Bankr. E.D. Mich. entered Dec. 5, 2013) (No. 1945),
http://content.foxtvmedia.com/wjbk/pdf/OPINION-REGARDINGELIGIBILITY.pdf.
397. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012).
398. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
399. See supra notes 192–200 and accompanying text (discussing
municipality features).
400. See In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 974 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1989) (ruling that 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) “simply requires the Court to
make a determination of whether or not the plan as proposed is better than the
alternatives”).
401. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(1) (incorporating the “fair and equitable” standard of
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) through 11 U.S.C. § 901(a)).
402. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.04[3]
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013) (explaining that
§ 1129(b) requires full payment to an unsecured creditor; if the unsecured
creditor cannot be paid in full, “they have to be assured that no junior creditor
or equity participant receive anything under the plan”).
403. Lorber v. Vista. Irrigation Dist, 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942)
(quoting Bekins v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 680, 685 (9th
Cir. 1940)).
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interpreting the standard, however, justifying creditor incertitude
about Chapter 9 treatment. The vague confirmation standards
may play a key role in encouraging creditor cooperation in
Chapter 9.404
The confirmation standards also implicate the relationship
between state and federal law. The Code states that in order for a
Chapter 9 plan to be confirmed, the debtor must not be
“prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out
the plan.”405 That raises the question of whether a municipal
debtor in a state with constitutional pension protections can
propose a plan that modifies pensions that will be confirmed by
the court. If bankruptcy authorization is an all-or-nothing
proposition, the answer should be yes, but again, case law is
scant. In one of the few cases interpreting this requirement, the
court held that reading it to prohibit a plan of adjustment from
reducing payments to bondholders in contravention of state law
would defeat the entire purpose of Chapter 9.406 According to that
court, the plan going forward must comply with state law.407 As a
result, Detroit should be able to restructure its pension
obligations in its Chapter 9 plan, but any restructured employee
benefits would be subject to Michigan’s constitutional protections
after plan confirmation.
B. Debtor Governance in Weak Governance States
Although municipal bankruptcy law was designed to
facilitate state rehabilitation schemes, Chapter 9 does not require
that a state play any role in a municipal bankruptcy case other
than to authorize filing. Some states, such as Alabama and
404. See B. Summer Chandler & Mark S. Kauffman, Maybe Taxes Aren’t So
Certain: What is “Fair and Equitable” in a Chapter 9 Plan?, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Feb. 2013, at 12, 70 (noting that the “uncertainty may motivate a municipality
and its creditors to reach agreement on debt relief, rather than turning to a
court to decide the issue”).
405. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4) (2012).
406. See In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 974 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1989) (stating that under such a ruling, “the whole purpose and
structure of Chapter 9 would be of little value”).
407. See id. (ruling that new bonds issued pursuant to the debtor’s plan of
adjustment “must be issued in conformance with state law”).
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California, have declined to exercise reorganizational governance
over their Chapter 9 debtors.408 In those states, a Chapter 9 filing
can only result in a fresh start unless the municipality itself has
a plan to resolve the structural problems that led to the filing.
If the fresh start is the goal of Chapter 9 in states that do not
provide reorganizational governance, it may be up to the
bankruptcy courts to ensure that only worthy municipal debtors
file for bankruptcy, just as they do when an individual files for
bankruptcy. The Code lets them do so; although some of the entry
requirements are objectively determinable, such as whether the
debtor is insolvent409 and whether it is authorized by its state to
file,410 others leave more discretion in the bankruptcy judge. The
Chapter 9 eligibility requirements both invite the state to provide
rehabilitative governance over the debtor and allow a court to
exercise a measure of bankruptcy governance.411 For example, a
municipality can be a debtor only if it “desires to effect a plan to
adjust” its debts,412 if it first negotiates in good faith with its
creditors,413 and if it files its petition in good faith.414 These entry
requirements give a court some discretion in determining
whether a filing is likely to have some benefit for the city or will
simply result in a drawn-out process with little benefit to the
debtors or its creditors.415 When the state plays no role in the
bankruptcy, the court may play a larger role in encouraging
negotiation, such as by the appointment of a mediator.416 Each
408. See supra notes 312–13, 333 and accompanying text (discussing
municipal bankruptcy governance in Alabama and California).
409. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2012).
410. Id. § 109(c)(2).
411. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (detailing the eligibility
requirements for Chapter 9).
412. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4).
413. Id. § 109(c)(5). The municipality may be excused from this requirement
if it shows that negotiation with creditors would be impracticable. Id.
§ 109(c)(5)(C).
414. See id. § 921(c) (allowing the court to dismiss a petition that is not filed
in good faith).
415. See In re City of Stockton, Cal., 493 B.R. 772, 794 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
2013) (stating that the good faith requirement “serves a policy objective of
assuring that the Chapter 9 process is being used in a manner consistent with
the reorganization purposes of the Bankruptcy Code”).
416. See id. at 783 (referencing the court-ordered mediation process for
Stockton’s municipal bankruptcy); see also In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-
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state must decide whether municipal bankruptcy should facilitate
more than a fresh start; in states where the fresh start is the only
goal of a Chapter 9 case, the court must ensure that the case can
achieve that goal.
VIII. Conclusion
A city’s descent into financial distress forces a new look at
rarely used laws. Municipal bankruptcies are rare, and because
Chapter 9 filings are few and far between, the body of case law
that has developed to govern them is small. Because decades
passed between the passage of the first municipal bankruptcy
legislation and the possibility that a major city would have to use
it, the original purpose of Chapter 9 was forgotten.
Chapter 9 was never intended to serve as a comprehensive
scheme to solve municipal financial problems; it was designed to
complement state efforts to solve those problems. Chapter 9 does
indeed anticipate restructuring governance over a municipal
debtor, but in the hands of the state, not in the hands of a
bankruptcy judge. That governance concession is consistent with
the original goals of the predecessor to Chapter 9.
Concluding that Chapter 9 accommodates appropriate debtor
governance, however, does not answer the question of whether
Chapter 9 is an effective financial restructuring tool for cities.
Chapter 9 may only be as effective as each state’s plan for
municipal fiscal oversight. This conclusion does, however, allow
researchers and policy makers to focus on the role of each state in
developing an effective mechanism to not only resolve the
financial distress of its municipalities but develop sensible
structures for their municipalities going forward. This
mechanism should include both robust state oversight and the
safety valve of Chapter 9 if necessary to overcome holdout
creditors.

53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2013) (order appointing a mediator and
submitting the case to mediation). In the latter case, the state is responsible for
developing the Chapter 9 plan through Detroit’s Emergency Manager. See supra
notes 340–49 and accompanying text (discussing Detroit’s use of an emergency
manger).

